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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Helicon is a student run academic Journal designed
to enhance the academic environment of
Connecticut College. Conceived one year ago, in the
Spring of 1978, The Journal has been one full year
in the planning. The Editors are proud to present
five articles which we believe represent some of the
College's finest written work by students. The
publication of this Journal is based on a desire to
establish an outlet for outstanding written work by
Connecticut College students, to provide motiva-
tion for scholarship outside of the classroom, and to
strengthen the academic bonds which exist in this
Liberal Arts community. The staff of Helicon
wishes to extend its deepest gratitude to the many
people whose contributions made this Journal
possible, and to express our hope that Helicon will
become a lasting academic tradition at Connecticut
College.
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Evan Stone
T. S. Eliot and Thomas Mann:
The Decline of
Western Civilization
Contemporary Western civilization, traumatized by
two world wars of 'self-annihilation', gives little aid
to its inhabitants who continually search for life's
meaning. Is Western civilization terminally ill? Is
this sickness embodied in the very fabric of western
society? Or is this disease curable? In this paper,
Evan Stone examines T.S. Eliot and Thomas
Mann's response to contemporary civilization's
malaise.
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Europe's trauma in the twentieth century has
led to the pessimistic and oft-repeated claim that
Western Civilization is 'sick.' Indeed, the spectacle
of two wars of self-annihilation seems to be
testimony to this fact. The works of T.S. Eliot and
Thomas Mann reflect Europe's self-conscious ex-
amination of its 'sickness,' with "The Love Song of
J. Alfred Prufrock" (1917), "Gerontion" (1920),and
"The Wasteland" (1923) representing Eliot's
'diagnosis,' while Mann gives his 'diagnosis' in
"Death in Venice" (1911). Yet, along with this
'sickness,' and its corresponding cultural despair,
there is a conviction that Europe can be 'cured.'
Eliot offers a solution in his religious works, After
Strange Gods (1934) and The Idea of a Christian
Society (1940).Mann's 'cure' can be found in Past
Masters (1933), a collection of his essays. By ex-
amining and comparing these works, one can gain
insight into the image that Western Civilization has
of itself.
*
In an essay entitled "Sleep, Sweet Sleep,"
Thomas Mann states:
I conceivethat all individualexistenceis
to be interpreted as a supra-sensualact of
the will, a resolve to concentrate, limit
and take shape, to assemble out of
nothingness,to renouncefreedomand in-
finity and all slumberingin spacelessand
timelessnight...'
According to Mann, humanity creates form
from the "timeless night"; it constructs a symbolic
framework which gives order and coherence to ex
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perience.There is no pre-formed reality which exists
exclusive of humanity. Rather, the forms which
comprise ordered experience are a result of man's
"act of will." Mankind's concepts, symbols and
morality all fall under the broad heading of 'form.'
Indeed, the word is synonymous with 'civilization.'
In discussing Mann's vision of civilization, one
must necessarily examine the thesis presented in
Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (1872).
Mannwas greatly influenced by the ideas put forth
in this work and states that Nietzsche's philosophy
"was of ... basic importance to me personally in the
shaping of my own mind, and has left ... [an]
indelibleimprint on it."
Nietzsche sees civilization as arising out of
chaotic, infinite nature. Mankind's primal existence
in nature is unfettered by morality or any other
ordered form. The formless world, best symbolized
by an exotic, lush jungle, teems with bestiality,
fecundity and fatality. Nietzsche calls this world
"Dionysian," in honor of the Greek god of wine and
celebration. Nietzsche envisions orgiastic,
Dionysian revelry:
In nearly every instance the centre of
these festivals lay in extravagant sexual
licentiousness,the waves of which over-
whelmedall family life and its venerable
traditions; the very wildest beasts of
nature werelet loose here, including that
... mixture of lust and cruelty which has
always seemed to me the genuine
'witches' draught' ... a
Yet, through his will, man transforms chaos in-
to civilization and gives coherence to experience. He
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creates morality and artwork, and develops a sense
of aesthetic beauty. Nietzsche believes that the
world of form, with its constructed moral and
aesthetic ideals, is based on appearances. He
delegates this realm to Apollo, Greek god of light.
Nietzsche further asserts that the unfettered
Dionysian world is "reality," while the Apollonian
domain, which relies on man-made forms and sym-
bols, is just an "illusion":
This . . . acquiescence in the dream-
experiencehas ... been embodiedby the
Greeks in their Apollo ... the god of all
shaping energies... the 'shining one,' the
deity of light . . . His eye must be
'sunlike, I according to his origin; even
whenit is angry and looksdispleased,the
sacrednessofhis beauteousappearanceis
still there.'
Civilization is perpetually at odds with the
Dionysian element from which it arose. Nietzsche
gives his interpretation of the Ancient Greek
dilemma:
... the Greekswere ... guarded against
the feverish agitation of these festivals
by the figure of Apollo, himself rising
here in fullpride,whocouldnot have held
out the Gorgan's head to a more
dangerous power than this grotesquely
uncouth Dionysian.'
Thomas Mann views the artist as an Apollonian
upholder of form:
Themorality of the artist consists in this
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'gathering,' this powerof egoisticconcan-
tration, this will to form, to limit, to
shape, to embody;to give up the freedom
of the infinite ... •
These words could easily have been spoken by
Gustave Aschenbach, the protagonist of Mann's
"Death in Venice." Mann explains that Aschenbach
"renounces sympathy with the abyss. "7 Going one
step further, Aschenbach's "young days never
knew the sweet idleness and the laissez aller that
belong to youth. ". In simple terms, "Aschenbach
was not pleasure loving." Aschenbach is a formal
man; he is the symbol of structured Apollonian
civilization. In "Death in Venice," his struggle is
not merely the crisis of a single man, but is the
essential crisis of all civilizations, as they have all
necessarily risen from "the abyss." His fall
represents civilization's reversion to a barbaric past
and, in light of the Nazis' eventual accession to
power, is a frightening portent of things to come.
Aschenbach, although quite famous, is a man
bored with the regularity of his daily routine. He
feels a desire to travel. Yet, Aschenbach is not con-
scious of the great irrational drive which exists
within himself, a Dionysian drive which will smash
his rationalist world of forms into nothingness. In
imagining the following scene, Aschenbach shows
himself to be restless for a taste of the exotic:
He beheld a landscape, a tropical
marshlandbeneath a reeking sky, steam-
ing, monstrous, rank-a kind of primeval
wilderness world of islands, morasses,
andalluvialchannels Thereweretrees,
mis-shapenas a dream hefelt his heart
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throbwith terror, yet witha longinginex-
plicable.r c
Aschenbach travels to Venice, and it is here
that he beholds Tadzio, whom he first admires for
his aesthetic beauty: "His face recalled the noblest
moment in Greek sculpture."" There can be no bet-
ter example of form than Greek sculpture and, in
view of Aschenbach's later fall, this precisely cap-
tures the point which Mann is attempting to make:
Inherent in all form is the possibility of chaos. The
chaos which opposes form is by no means an-
tithetical to life. Rather, the very opposite is true.
Chaos, like the jungle described above, is the realm
of unrestrained bestiality and boundless fertility.
Yet the jungle is also a place of fatality. Tadzio, the
very essence of beauty, becomes Aschenbach's
"horror" (the key word from Conrad's Heart of
Darkness) and death. At first, viewing the Polish
boy, Aschenbach's "heart was stirred, it felt a
father's kindness ... " Yet, Aschenbach's "kind-
ness" degenerates into a lust and eventually he
stalks wildly through Venice after his prey, his face
pathetically made up to look younger. In seeking
release in formless, primordial chaos, Aschenbach
seeks a world without morality. He seeks death.
Mann, the master of the leitmotif, has several
important symbols which run through "Death in
Venice." The figure of Death appears repeatedly,
always wearing the tell-tale straw hat. Initially,
Death is incarnated in the "bold and domineering""
stranger that Aschenbach sees on a walk through
Munich. The ticket-seller, with his "bony yellow
fingers,"" the gondolier, with his gondola shaped
like a coffin, the nauseous old man on-board ship,
and the musician, with "a strong smell of
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carbolic,"l5 all represent Death. Tadzio watches
fromthe balcony as the musician plays. They repre-
sent the two synonymous powers which beckon
Aschenbach: fecundity and fatality.
Mann uses the city of Venice itself to symbolize
the exotic lure of the chaotic life. The beautiful city
has an ugly secret, a plague of cholera. Beauty lures
the traveller to stay' in Venice, while cholera kills
him off: "The horizon looked close and prosaic.
When Aschenbach opened his window he thought
he smelt the stagnant odour of the lagoon. "16 To
remain in Venice means the collapse of form.
Aschenbachattempts to leave the city, an act which
can be seen as his last "supra-sensual act of the
will." The attempt ends in failure; Aschenbach is
unable to halt his descent into the abyss. He is
wrackedby agony as he tries to flee:
. the tale of his journey across the
lagoon was a tale of woe, a passage
throughthe veryvalley of regrets ... The
travellergazed· and his bosom was torn.
The atmosphere of the city, the faintly
rotten scent of swampand sea, which had
drivenhimto leave- in what deep, tender,
almostpainfuldraughts he breathed it in!
Howwas it he had not known, had not
thought, how much his heart was set
upon it all! What this morning had been
slight regret, somelittle doubt of his own
wisdom, turned now to grief, to actual
wretchedness,a mental agony so sharp
that it repeatedly brought tears to his
eyes,whilehe questioned himself how he
couldhave forseenit.H
Aschenbach's surprise at this powerful inner
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turmoil parallels the Apollonian perception of
Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy:
With what astonishment must the
ApollonianGreek have beheld him!With
an astonishment which was all the
greater the more it was mingledwith the
shuddering suspicion that all this was in
reality not so very foreign to him, yea,
that, like unto a veil, his Apolloniancon-
sciousness only hid this Dionysian world
from his view.' B
*
Mann's most powerful symbol, one which Eliot
also uses, is the ocean. In his essay, "Sleep, Sweet
Sleep," Mann states: "Infinity ... the sea ... old as
my love of sleep is my love of the sea. "19 (the punc-
tuation is Mann's) Once again, Aschenbach echoes
Mann. The author describes his protagonist: "His
love of the ocean had profound sources ... [it wasJ
opposed to his art and perhaps for that very reason
a lure, for the unorganised, the immeasurable, the
eternal - in short, for nothingness. "zo The ocean,
more than anything else, is the symbol of the
blankness from which civilization arose. Indeed, it
is not merely a symbol, for science claims that life
originated in the ocean. The ocean is timeless, ex-
isting regardless of morals or lust. It is "the ele-
ment.JJ21
Before continuing with Mann, one must look at
Eliot, as the subject of ocean-as-symbol is a
"ground" for comparing the two writers. In "The
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," the protagonists'
monologue ends by the sea-shore. This obviously
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parallels Aschenbach, who dies as he watches
Tadzio standing on a sand-bar. Before attempting
to make a statement on Eliot's version of the sea,
one must first compare the characters of
Aschenbach and Prufrock, as this is useful in con-
trasting Eliot's and Mann's view of Western
Civilization.
Both Prufrock and Aschenbach are urban men;
they exist within the framework of social etiquette
and afternoon tea. At the outset of "Death in
Venice," Mann states that "Aschenbach had
sought the open soon after tea. "22 This is com-
para ble to Prufrock's situation:
For I have known them all already,
known them all-Have known the
evenings, mornings, afternoons, I have
measured out my lifewith coffeespoons."
Indeed, society has been structured to a stifling
degree. Prufrock is an indecisive character, whose
agonies are magnified by a painful awareness of this
indecision. Prufrock's awareness of his own
paralysis does not help him overcome it. Rather, he
wallows in it all the more. One cannot dismiss
Prufrock as a mere inept fool, as he appears to be
Eliot's prototype of modern man. If Prufrock is a
'hero,' then he is a hero of the weak. Yet, Prufrock's
ordeal would not be alien to Aschenbach, as the lat-
ter writes of a "heroism born of weakness. And,
after all, what kind could be truer to the spirit of the
times? Gustave Aschenbach was the poet-
spokesman of all those who labour at the edge of ex-
haustion.'?" Of all the figures in literature and
history, St. Sebastian, pierced by arrows, is the
most accurate representation of an Aschenbach
hero.
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Prufrock is unable to communicate with
women; he is unable to break free of the formality
which governs his life. He hesitates at the edge of a
freer, sensual world:
Is it perfume froma dress
That makes me so digress?
And should I then presume?
And how should I begin?"
Prufrock, unable to cope with present failures, tries
to put the crucial moment into the future:
And indeed there will be time"
Time for you and time for me,
And time for a hundred indecisions
And for a hundred visions and revisions,
Before the taking of toast and tea."
Yet, Prufrock must eventually face the challenge of
confronting his lady-friend:
Should I, after tea and cakes and ices,
Have the strength to forcethe moment to
its crisis?"
The reader knows that Prufrock has failed when the
tense of the poem changes: "And would it have been
worth it after all ... "29
Prufrock is doomed never to cross the border
which stands before him. Meanwhile, Aschenbach,
crossing all borders, slides into the abyss. Never-
theless, Aschenbach's descent takes place in a man-
ner of stages. He experiences some Prufrock-like
moments before making his final plunge.
Aschenbach's embarrassing hesitancy, although
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temporary, can be seen when he shies away from
patting Tadzio on the head: '''Too late! Too late!' he
thought as he went by. But was it too late? "30These
words could have been spoken by Prufrock himself.
Yet Aschenbach is different from Prufrock.
Eliot uses a fruit motif to suggest Prufrock's
speculation on sexual adventures: "Do I dare to eat
a peach?":" Aschenbach, on the other hand, is not so
reserved:
His head burned, his body was wet with
clammy sweat, he was plagued by in-
tolerable thirst. He looked about for
refreshment, of whatever sort, and found
a little fruit-shop where he bought some
strawberries. They were overripe and
soft; he ate them as he went."
Aschenbach soon dies, no doubt poisoned by
the diseased, overripe strawberries, symbol' of
Dionysian fecundity and death. Aschenbach, unlike
Prufrock, has tasted that which is forbidden. Is that
the only difference between the two characters? Is
Aschenbach only a Prufrock who has stepped over
the line? Hardly. An affirmative answer to these
questions would imply that the world views ex-
pressed in "Death in Venice" and "The Love Song
of J. Alfred Prufrock" were the same, since both
characters were being measured by the same
means. Yet, Eliot's view is far different from
Mann's. Hence, although both characters are sym-
bols of a spiritual decline, as well as sharing several
characteristics already mentioned, they exist in dif-
ferently conceived structures.
The forms in Mann's world signify a moral
striving for 'higher things.' Aschenbach is
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described as a great moralist, bettering humanity
with his works. The quest for the higher forms, as in
the Greek cosmos, is what guides man in his pact
with Apollo. Beauty, reason, virtue and truth stand
as Plato's Good. Aschenbach speaks as Socrates:
For beauty, my Phaedrus, beauty alone,
is lovely and visible at once. For, mark
you, it is the sole aspect of the spiritual
which we can perceive through our
senses, or bear so to perceive. Else what
should become of us if the divine, if
reason and virtue and truth, were to
speak to us through the senses? Should
wenot perish and be consumedby love,as
Semele aforetime was by Zeus? So
beauty, then, is the beauty·lover's wayto
the spirit . . . 3J
The admiration of Tadzio's beautiful form is a way
of achieving higher spirituality. Of course, inherent
in these forms, is possible annihilation in the dark
abyss. This is Mann's central point. Form is
essential to civilization but, no matter how high-
minded its conception, is weak. Is this also Eliot's
view?
Prufrock, like Aschenbach, represents a highly
structured world. Yet, whereas Aschenbach is a
highly respected man of letters, Prufrock is a
vacillating nonentity, the typical 'little man.' If
both Aschenbach and Prufrock are prototypic men,
then the world-views of their creators are clearly dif-
ferent. Whereas Mann sees the forms of modern
civilization as essential but weak, Eliot sees the cur-
rent forms as non-essential and inimical to
mankind's growth. The specter of Prufrock's dead
city symbolizes civilization's failure:
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Let us go, through certain half-deserted
streets,
Themuttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap
hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster
shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious
argument
Of insidiousintent."
Further, in Eliot's "Gerontion," the narrator says:
I was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warmrain."
This is a reference to the Battle of Thermopylae
(Greek for "hot gates"), in 480 B.C., when the
Greeks defended their civilization against Persian
encroachment." In fighting for their civilization,
the Greeks were defending that very beauty, the
form of virtue and truth, which Socrates described
to Phaedrus. Thermopylae had a meaning. Yet,
Gerontion says that he has not fought, although the
poem was written in 1920, only two years after the
!'lndof World War One. Eliot's point is that even if
one has fought in the Great War, it is a meaningless
act. World War One, unlike Thermopylae, was a
hollow struggle; there were no substantive forms to
defend. Gerontion says "My house is a decayed
house.'?"
Eliot is critical of modern society's materialism.
Unfortunately his aversion to materialism is
intertwined with a powerful anti-Semetism. Eliot
makes the dangerous association of capitalism and
Judaism:
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And the Jew squats on the windowsill,
the owner,
Spawned in someestaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled
in London."
Further, Eliot is disdainful of "Hakagawa, bowing
among the Titians."" Hakagawa is a materialist,
unable to comprehend or appreciate aesthetic
beauty. Behind the confusion of Eliot's ugly racial
remarks is a deep rooted distrust of modernity.
Eliot's modern man is caught in a world of crass
material forms. Like Prufrock, he is trapped in a
profane world. Indeed, even if Prufrock had
succeeded in asking the "overwhelming question, ....
would this be any guarantee that his life would be
more fruitful?
Would it have been worth while,
After the sunsets and the dooryards and
the sprinkled streets,
After the novels, after the teacups, after
the skirts that
trail along the floor-"
Prufrock's world is sterile. This is in contrast to
Aschenbach, who could lose himself in Dionysian,
death-like sexual abandon. Yet, Eliot equates skirts
on the floor, a sexual symbol, with the banality of
novels and teacups. There is no Dionysian release in
Eliot's world. Even sex is mechanistic and hollow.
There is no suggestion of fertility in Eliot's women.
Rather, there is an air of sickness. Gerontion says:
The womankeeps the kitchen, makes tea,
Sneezes at evening, poking the peevish
gutter."
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Obviously, Eliot's greatest work on Western
Civilization's sterility is "The Waste Land."
Although the complexities of this poem are seem-
ingly infinite, one can still focus on a few salient
points. Firstly, the section entitled "A Game of
Chess" is dominated by a conversation in a lower
class bar. The conversation centers around physical
ugliness, a dislike of sex, and abortion:
You ought to be ashamed, I said, to look
so antique,
(And her only thirty-one).
I can't help it, she said, pulling a long
face,
It's them pills I took to bring it off she
said.
(She's had five already, and nearly died of
young George)
The chemist said it would be all right, but
I've never been the same."
One of the crucial lines in the poem follows shortly
thereafter: "What you get married for if you don't
want children?":" A diseased civilization is ques-
tioning the value of its own propagation. There is no
chaotic fecundity in Eliot's world of fatality. Even
death is barren:
What is that sound high in the air
Murmer of maternal lamentation
Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked
earth
Ringed by flat horizon only
What is the city over the mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the
violet air
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Falling towers
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
ViennaLondon
Unreal."
At this point one can return to the seaside
where Prufrock stands at the end of his narrative.
The ocean which Aschenbach gazed into
represented primal formlessness, but it is now clear
that Eliot's sea represents something entirely dif-
ferent. On one hand, the sea may represent
Prufrock's repressed adventurous side, but a more
general meaning may also be extracted. In a world
which is a "heap of broken images,"" the sea em-
bodies a oneness, or unity. Prufrock says:
Shall I part my hair behind?Do I dare to
eat a peach?
I shall wear white flannel trousers, and
walk upon the beach,
I have heard the mermaids singing, each
to each.
I do not think they will sing to me."
The mermaids will not sing for Prufrock, yet
they sang for Odysseus. When one compares this to
Gerontion, who did not fight at Thermopylae in the
"warm rain," it appears that Eliot, while critical of
modern civilization, is not critical of all civilizations.
He upholds the symbolic structure of Ancient
Greece. His idyllic view is in sharp contrast to the
turmoil which Nietzsche describes in The Birth of
Tragedy.
In order for a civilization to be vital and produc-
tive, like Eliot's Ancient Greece, its concepts and
morals must likewise be vital. The problem with
Western Civilization, it would appear, is that it
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subscribes to the wrong forms. Further, can 'wrong
forms' be considered forms at all? How did civiliza-
tion arrive at such a state? How can it be cured?
Eliot's proposed remedy for the West is that it
adopt the 'correct' morality. Eliot desires a unified
cultural whole and he believes that Christianity is
the answer. For the West to be rid of its malady, it
must mold itself into a Christian society. In The
Idea of a Christian Society, Eliot states:
The Community of Christians is ... com-
posedofboth clergy and laity, of the more
conscious and intellectually developedof
both. Itwillbe their identify of beliefand
aspiration, their background ofa common
system of education and a common
culture, which will enable them to in-
fluence and be influenced by each other,
and collectively to form the conscious
mind ..... 8
Eliot, unlike Mann, believes that there are cer-
tain forms which are predetermined and exist ex-
clusive of mankind's structural "act of the will."
Such is the case of Christian morality, Eliot's foun-
dation of a healthy civilization. Eliot views the
modern, un-Christian world as the abyss. The forms
(morals) are materialistic and incoherent. Hence,
chaos reigns. Indeed, when one says that Western
Civilization has the wrong forms, one is still being
too generous. According to Eliot, the West has no
form at all.
The views of Mann and Eliot clearly diverge. To
Mann, the modern world, the equivalent of form,
combats formlessness. However, Eliot's modern
civilization is formless itself, a "heap of broken im-
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ages." Chaos is all that exists prior to Mann's
civilization. Yet, prior to Eliot's modern world, the
one true set of forms exist. Not only are the views of
these men divergent, they are opposites.
*
Eliot's exhortation for a single holy order car-
ries an ominous tone. In After Strange Gods he
states:
What is still moreimportant [than similar
cultural backgrounds)is unity ofreligious
background; and reasons of race and
religion combine to make any large
number of free thinking Jews
undesirable."
In view of the "final solution," which was
inaugurated less than ten years after this utterance
was put forth, such words carry a frightening con-
notation. Eliot, with his conservative program for a
cultural community, finds individualism and
Liberalism distasteful. Modern society's task is to
concentrate, not to dissipate, to renew
our association with traditional wisdom;
to re-establish a vital connexionbetween
the individual and the race; the struggle,
in a word, against Liberalism."
In his essay entitled "Freud's Position in the
History of Western Thought," Thomas Mann com-
ments on such conservatism by stating "that in-
deed reformations by their very nature have little to
do with progress, since they tend to re-establish the
old and the oldest in an extremely conservative
Eliot and Mann 23
sense ... "" Mann differentiates between reaction
and revolution "according as it faces to the past or
to the future."" One can see Eliot's backward-
looking vision in "The Wasteland." Using the recur-
rent water imagery, Eliot describes the present
Thames:
The river sweats
Oil and tar."
This pollution is quickly contrasted to the clean
Thames which Queen Elizabeth I traverses in her
barge." Eliot finds the past a beckoning prospect.
Does Eliot fall under Mann's description of a
reactionary?
Backwards, is the cry: back into the
night, the sacred primitive, the fore-
known, the life bearing: backwards into
the romantical, prehistorical mother-
womb.That is the languageofreaction...
the will is present to 'forceback our feel-
ing into the great old ways of lookingat
man and the world';alwaysthe ideaofthe
sacred past and the fruitfulnessof death
is set over against the ... idealistic op-
timism of the daylight cult of Apollo."
Before attributing these words to Eliot, it must be
stated that Mann's Aschenbach is the ultimate
form of reactionary; he quests for the Dionysian
"motherwomb" of death. Yet, can Eliot's conser-
vative, backwards-looking quest for a Christian
Society be compared to Aschenbach's romantic
predilection for death? After all, in prescribing
Christianity, Eliot advocates a highly structured
set of forms, while Aschenbach seeks the formless.
How can both be classified as reactionaries?
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Aschenbach makes the transition from
modernity to the abyss in a matter of days. His
degeneration takes place in a series of stages,
although by the time of his "stranger god" dream,
his fall is absolute. His morality has been stamped
out. Yet, it is possible to quest for the past without
completely immersing oneself in primordial chaos.
Eliot's longing for the past does not extend to the
mistiness of pre-history. Rather, his Christian
Society was first conceived less than two thousand
years ago. Aschenbach's reaction is absolute, while
Eliot's is relative. Perhaps Eliot's ultimate inner
desire was to descend into the formless, but this in-
volves psychological speculation not verified in his
Christian writings.
Gerontion speaks:
In the juvescence of the year
CameChrist the tiger."
Yet man fails to heed the word:
After such knowledgewhat forgiveness?
Think now
History has many cunning passages,
contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering
ambitions,
Guides us by vanities.57
But Christ is eternal. Again, "the tiger springs in
the new year. "58 Mankind, in the "cunning
passages" of history, has made a wrong turn and
hence, created the world of a Prufrock. According to
Eliot, the lack of unity or sense of community can
be traced to Liberal Rennaissance Humanism,
which engenders individualism.
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However, Mann is a Humanist. He cannot be
satisfied with looking backwards for an answer.
But, unlike Eliot, he cannot offer any general 'cure'
for Western Civilization. Whatever a civilization's
achievement, Dionysian night will always linger in
the background. Yet, Mann is no defeatist. He
believes in the "revolutionary principle," which ac-
counts for progress and the forward movement of
time. Hence, it acknowledges history. Eliot's
timeless solution of "Christ the tiger" denies the
importance of history and its "cunning passages."
In his essays, Mann puts forth his view:
The revolutionary principleis simply the
will towards the future, which Novalis
called •the really better world.' It is the
principle of consciousness and recogni-
tion, leading to higher levels;the willand
urge to destroy -by meansoflifting them
into consciousness- all the premature ap-
parent harmonies and pseudo-perfections
of life, that rest upon uncertain and
morally inadequate awareness; and by
analysis, by psychology,through phases
of solution which, fromthe point of view
of cultural unity, must be designated as
anarchy, but in which there is no pause
and no retreat, no restoration, no tenable
standing ground, to break a path to free
and genuine unity of existence, secured
by consciouspossession,to the culture of
men developed to complete-
consciousness. The name of revolution
belongs only to the will that leads
futurewards by the path of consciousness
and resolution. This is what youth must
be told today. No teaching or incitement
to the great 'Back, back!' no zeal for the
26 Evan Stone
past for its own sake, can write the word
upon its banner save for the open end of
confusion, By which I do not mean that
the revolutionary will knows nothing of
the past or of the deeps. The contrary
should be asserted. Itmust and will know
much of them, be very thoroughly at
home therein; if only these dark precincts
do not allure it for their own sake, if only
it does not make common cause with
them to preserve the pseudo-religious and
the sham·traditional, in short, out of reac-
tionary instinct; but instead presses on as
a liberator and enlightener ... "
In summation, there is quite a difference in the
views of Mann and Eliot. Mann sees civilization in a
perpetual war with itself; its constructed morality
opposes the great abyss from which life arises and
perishes. Eliot sees modern civilization as an abyss
in itself, lacking coherent and unifying Christian
forms. To Eliot, there is nothing worse than the
non-Christian society of his day. He writes, in 1939,
"If you will not have God (and he is a jealous God)
you should pay your respects to Hitler or Stalin. "50
Yet, the colossal catastrophe of the World Wars
makes this a hollow statement. Indeed, if there is a
danger to civilization, it is the specter of hysterical
reaction, which denies history. Such is the legacy of
Fascism, the absolute reaction to modern civiliza-
tion. Such a reaction produced the Holocaust, man's
deepest plunge into the abyss. The Fascist solution
and Eliot's answer are both backwards-looking.
However, Fascism is an absolute reaction, whereas
Eliot's 'cure' is only relative. Both reactions
emanate from the self-doubt which plagues Western
Civilization.
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Noah Sorkin
Adam Smith:
An Historical Misconception
Major economic theories developed throughout
history still influence contemporary economic
policy. The character of the American economy con-
tinues to feel the impact of the basic tenets put forth
by such minds as John Maynard Keynes, Alfred
Marshall; and Karl Marx. To misunderstand the
thoughts of past economists is to risk ignorance of
the forces which steer our financial world. In the
following essay, Noah Sorkin examines the implica-
tions of the contemporary misinterpretation of the
ideas developed by the Father of Economics, Adam
Smith.
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It is very often the desire of contemporary
scholars to trace the origins of the various social
sciences back to particular historical figures. Thus
we tend to attribute modern sociology to the
thoughts of Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, while
no less a giant than Sigmund Freud receives
posthumous credit for the field of psychology. In-
deed, for anyone of the many disciplines which com-
prise the bulk of the social sciences we might look
back through time in an effort to discover the roots
of these fields in the minds and work of particular
men. By so doing, we lend to the various disciplines
a sort of temporal continuity which enables us to
follow the growth and development of social
thought through the years.
In general, the foundations laid down by these
past scholars have been correctly understood by
generations of future social scientists. This is not to
say that these foundations have remained sacred
and unaltered; certainly, years of debate, ex.
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permentation, upheaval and discovery have
wrought significant changes in each of the social
sciences as they were first developed by earlier
scholars. Yet regardless of the reaction with which
they may presently meet, the famous theories of
such men as Darwin, Boas, Durkheirn, Marx, Freud,
and Malinowski are understood in a clear manner. It
is thus no little surprise that when we focus on the
field of economics, and, in particular, on the figure
to whom this vast discipline's foundation is at-
tributed, understanding falls by the wayside;
modern man has misinterpreted Adam Smith.
There is a certain element of sadness to this
mlsinterpretatlon: Smith's 1776 masterpiece The
Wealth of Nations, the volume responsible for
beginning the science of economics, took over eight
years of hard work and study to complete. Indeed,
one might validly say that Smith's life is bound up
in this book. Thus the thought that the essence of
his work would, in the future, be misconstrued by so
many parties is certainly frustrating. Yet the impor-
tance of the misconceptions concerning Smith's
thoughts and writing greatly transcends the level of
oneman's efforts and energy spent in vain, for these
very misconceptions have played an enormous role
in the formation of American economic thought
since the middle of the nineteenth century.
In order to best analyze the misconceptions
concerning Adam Smith, as well as the implications
which these misconceptions hold for present-day
economic thought, wemust be familiar with Smith's
major theories. What, then, was ~dam S~th trying
to do? What exactly was his main thrust m wrItmg
The Wealth of Nations? Only after we ~ave tackle.d
these questions can we proceed to examme how this
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man has fallen victim to the mistaken interpreta-
tion of so many economists, businessmen and
scholars.
Adam Smith, while writing his monumental
treatise on finance and society in the latter half of
the eighteenth century, was primarily concerned
with one fundamental question: What are the forces
which hold society together? The very weight of
such a question may at first make such a specula-
tion seem impossible to answer if not ludicrous to
ask. After all, the concept of society itself is a very
complex and intricate one, and there are a virtual
multitude of forces which, one might reasonably
conclude, "hold society together"; laws, customs,
authoritarian rule, spiritual beliefs and ethnic
similarities to name just a few. Yet as one reviews
the writing of Adam Smith it becomes clear what
Smith had in mind when he wrote of these forces
which bind a group of people into a recognizable
society. For upon observing the society in which he
lived, Smith realized that each individual member in
that society had a very specific role to play, that
each individual partook of some occupation which
not only sustained his own existence in that society,
but, more importantly, helped to sustain the ex-
istence of the society itself. To pose the problem in
somewhat simpler terms, consider for a moment the
man who sells shoes. Every day this man is in-
volved in transactions between himself and his
customers in which he gives up a pair of shoes in
return for a cash payment. Just as Adam Smith did,
we might consider this man to be a sole economic ac-
tor, while we might think of the customers in his
shop as representing society itself. Although such a
transaction may seem simple enough on the surface,
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Smith emphasized the vital role that such dealings
play in the survival of society; without the cash pay-
ment, our shoe salesman would be unable to pur-
chase the products he needs for his own well-being,
such as food, shelter and clothing. Even further
than this, however, if our shoe salesman is unable to
buy these products Smith reasoned that another
economic actor, perhaps the man who sells food,
would similarly be denied of needed cash payments
for his goods. As is clearly evident, Smith saw in
this process a chain reaction in which the economic
misfortune of one member of society soon
mushroomed into the economic misfortune of the
entire society. It was truly the genius of Adam
Smith to see that all economic actors are somehow
intricately bound together, that in some way the ac-
tions of the shoe salesman do in fact effect the ac-
tions of the grocer. And it is here that we first begin
to ascertain the task which Smith set before
himself, and to understand Smith's notion of
"forces which hold society together." For although
Smith observed the chaos of society, the hustle and
bustle of the market places, the confusion amidst
the shops where consumers crowded around
counters seeking bargains, and the mad scrambling
of factory workers hovering about assembly lines,
he sensed a certain order and logic which underlay
the surface hysteria of society. It was this order
which Smith strove to explain and define.
Smith began by noting that members of society
act solely out of self-interest. The tailor and the cob-
bler do not work their respective crafts so as to
bring joy and comfort to the bulk of society. In-
stead, these actors labor in an effort to sustain
themselves, to ensure their own material well-being.
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This may seem very evident to us, but for Smith it
brought to the forefront the fundamental question
to which The Wealth of Nations is directed: "How
is it possible for a community in which everyone is
busily following his own self-interest not to fly
apart from sheer centrifugal force.?" Here we see
that Adam Smith was concerned with a topic at the
very core of social structure and survival: what is it
that ensures the completion of those tasks so essen-
tial to society? Why is a policeman a policeman and
not a school teacher? Why does the merchant
choose to sell gloves and not hats? And how can the
consumer be so sure that the neighborhood store
will be supplied with desired goods? After all, if man
is free in a society to follow the whims of his mind, if
he is not constrained by some higher power or
authority to act in a specified way, there must be
some real, albeit intangible, force which guides him
in choosing to be a policeman, or sell gloves, or walk
to the neighborhood store confident of being able to
purchase the needed products.
Obviously, Smith recognized and acknowledged
what we so freely term the "profit motive." Yet he
did much more than simply state the fact that peo-
ple, in an economy which is structured around in-
dependent economic actors seeking wealth and lux-
ury, will act in a manner most conducive to earning
money. Adam Smith unraveled the laws of a fan-
tastic device: the market; the economic institution
which, thought Smith, allows society to exist. For,
as Robert Heilbroner has written in his chapter on
Smith, " ...self-interest is only half the picture. It
drives men to action. Something else must prevent
the pushing of profit-hungry individuals from
holding society up to exorbitant ransom: a com-
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munity activated only by self-interest would be a
community of ruthless profiteers. ",
Smith labeled this "regulator" of the profit-
hungry individual "competition"; that character of
the market which ensures that there will be just the
right amount of policemen on the force, gloves on
the merchants' shelves and supplies in the
neighborhood store. The Wealth of Nations is a
veritable blueprint of the economic forces which
serve to cement all the actions of the individuals in
a society into an organized and efficient whole.
Through his analysis of such economic ingredients
as price and cost, supply and demand, profit and
loss, Smith developed the famous concept of the
"invisible hand"; that intangible economic force
which, according to Adam Smith, allows society to
survive and flourish. A simple theoretical explana-
tion suffices to understand Smith's reasoning.
In order to continue living, a man needs food.
To purchase this food, since we assume that no one
will supply it free of charge, the man must have
money, and the only way of acquiring this money is
to exchange a good or service for a cash payment.
Suppose our individual economic actor decides to
sell wood. Further, assume, as is almost always the
case, that other individuals are also selling wood in
order to purchase food. If the first man should at-
tempt to sell lumber at a higher price than his com-
petitors he will certainly starve, for no one will be
willing to pay more than is necessary for any pro-
duct. If our man should charge less than his com-
petitors, they will then go hungry for all consumers
will flock with their purses to the first man. As
Smith reasoned, however, the other sellers will
quickly lower their prices in an effort to retain
customers.
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Itmight at first seem as if we have uncovered a
situation to be characterized by anything except
"logic and order." Yet Adam Smith predicted that
the end result of this shifting of prices in the lumber
market would be one described by modern
economists as "equilibrium'l-each individual seller
charging the same price for his product. And it is
here that one discerns the "logic and order" bound
up in the operation of the invisible hand. For this
marvelous force does not merely ensure that all
sellers of wood will have money to buy food. This
economic force also ensures that society will have
exactly the quantity of wood which it desires. If
consumers should suddenly change their preference
from wood to stone, our man will quickly begin to
feel the pangs of hunger as his sales slacken. In
order to eat he will leave the lumber business and
enter the market for stone. As he does this, more
stone will be offered for sale, and the desires of the
consumers will have been satisfied. If, on the other
hand, consumers should begin to demand more and
more wood, those who had originally been selling
stone will know hunger and lose little time in mov-
ing into the market for lumber. Once again the In-
visible hand was provided for the satisfaction of
society's needs.
Although we have so far been able to examine
Adam Smith's work through the use of an elemen·
tary model, there is a certain subtle implication to
the Wealth of Nations which not only must be
acknowledged, but which further reveals itself to be
the core of our examination concerning the great
misconception of Adam Smith. Smith had un·
covered a machine; a contraption which is fueled by
the market forces of supply and demand, steered by
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the "invisible hand" of self-interest, and regulated
by the phenomenon of competition. Yet once in
operationSmith realized that his machine could
veryeasilyfall victim to the pressures of scciety. In
otherwords, if the economy was not left free of out-
sideencroachment, if external forces were somehow
able to tamper with the inner workings of the
economicstructure, Smith believed that the ability
of the market to keep society alive would be lost.
Thus,the government should not interfere with the
workingsof the market, should not adopt policies
whichmight tend to restrain the free movement of
the "invisible hand," nor should businessmen be
permittedto enjoy such anti-competitive practices
as monopolies. Indeed anything which prevented
competition from prevailing in the market was
thoughtby Smith to be a hazard. For without com-
petition,there could be no invisible hand, no force to
guidethe actions of self-interested individuals in a
mannermost conducive to society as a whole.
And so here we are. Adam Smith did not ad-
vocate capitalism, that brand of economic action
where accumulation reigns supreme as each en-
treprenuer strives to "kill-off" his competitors.
AdamSmith did advocate competition, a situation
whereall economic actors are equal in the market.
Yet how do we today perceive of Adam Smith?
Whathas the "Father of economics" come to repre-
sent in the minds of so many economists, scholars
and businessmen? Perhaps no other concept of
economicand social philosophy is more closely
associatedwith the figure of Adam Smith than that
of "laissez-faire," the absolutist doctrine of a free-
market system with no government intervent~on
whatsoever.For the misconception of Adam SIDlth
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has been the use of this historical mind in support of
not a competitive market system, but one
thoroughly unrestrained, one in which the "invisi-
ble hand" so cherished by Smith is swept under the
surge of capitalist entrepreneurs who strive to
abolish competition.
These are, no doubt, strong words; and yet any
examination of American economic philosophy,
even the briefest of such examinations, bears out
the fact that an economy free of government in-
tervention, free of anti-trust laws, and trade regula-
tions, has been sought after by those in the financial
community for years. Businessmen have long
dreamed of an economywhere "freedom" is equated
to the right of doing business as one sees fit. Yet,
and here is the essential point, the American
economy, for over a century, has tended towards a
monopoly existence. Large corporations buyout
smaller corporations, market power becomes con-
centrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people,
and the "invisible hand" becomesimpotent to effect
the economy.
It is certainly not meant to be argued here that
we should attempt to structure the American
economy around the dictates of the eighteenth cen-
tury world from which Adam Smith arose. Yet
those who would use the thoughts of Smith in
praise of an economywhere there is no restraint on
individual economic actors have misconceived a
fundamental tenet of his work. For Smith would
want restraint in the form of anti-trust laws and
trade regulations to the extent that the competitive
nature of the market was threatened by the "free-
wheeling" tactics of businessmen and en.
trepreneurs. Indeed Adam Smith would heartily
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welcome any government regulations which strove
to maintain the competitive nature of the economy.
It is somewhat ironic that Adam Smith, the
champion of competition, should be used as a rally-
ing cry for "laissez-faire" economics, for "laissez-
faire" is synonomous with monopoly. It is certainly
one of the greatest misconceptions of economic
philosophy, for the mind of Adam Smith and the
concept of "lldssez-faire" are at very opposite ends
of a wide spectrum of social and economic thought.
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Andrew Rodwin
Progressive Nationalism
And Its Occurance
In Rhodesia
Since the end of World War II, the nations of
Southern Africa have been receiving increased at-
tention from observers of the world's political
systems. Established regimes are beginning to
falter as the oppressed majority quests for freedom.
In order to understand the contemporary disruptive
influences in this turbulent area it is necessary to
comprehend several basic premises behind the
nationalist-movements. Andrew Rodwin examines
various economic, political and social factors in
Rhodesia, applicable to the entire scope of the
African quest for independence.
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HYPOTHESIS
A society, although unique in itself, can be
analyzed in part by looking at the ethnic elements
of which it is composed. England and France, for ex-
ample, are societies dominated by the descendants
of such Germanic and Scandinavian tribes as the
Franks, Normans, and Saxons. The English and
French whose roots lie in these tribes comprise over-
whelming majorities in their respective countries. A
number of small, largely assimilated minorities ac-
cept the cultural standards of the white Germanic
descendants. Recognition of this is a key to
understanding the politics of England and France.
By contrast, a different ethnic configuration
which some societies have consists of an elite ruling
minority ethnic group dominating an oppressed ma-
jority ethnic group. Obvious examples of such a
society are the white "settler" societies of southern
Africa, manifestations of nineteenth century col-
onialism. (Many of these societies have now
succumbed to majority will in the form of African
majority governments, but conspicuous examples
of ruling white minorities remain.)
There are general characteristics endemic to the
type of society of which the southern African
countries are examples. There, the majority is
saddled with inferior economic opportunities allot-
ted them by the elite minority -- an inferiority that
will extend to a political impotence imposed to en-
force submission to such conditions. It is natural for
the majority group -- oppressed -- to remain
dissatisfied with the burdens suffered under such a
system. Isolated incidents of rebellion may be
staged. If the minority is well-entrenched, these in-
cidents will be ineffective, and the oppressed rna-
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jority will remain basically helpless, though
disgruntled.
Eventually, some mix of factors will combine to
provoke a majority movement, which will be both
continuous and organized. Such a movement may
be called nationalism.
That nationalism has continuity and organiza-
tion distinguishes it from earlier temporary, local in-
surrections. The nationalist movement makes its
demands on the ruling minority over time and
through broad organization, rather than
periodically and only through small interest groups
like trade unions. Although at the outset the move-
ment may be highly emotional, it will, from its
beginning, make specific political demands on the
ruling minority.
Whether such demands will be met is crucial,
and depends on the structure of government in the
society concerned. There is a British colonial dimen-
sion and a local white dimension in settler govern-
ments in southern Africa, and a tension between the
two. The British are largely concerned with
establishing representative governments in their
former colonies peacefully, and with accomodating
world and Commonwealth .opinion about the
character of the governments established. Local
white settlers, by contrast, are determined to keep
government in "civilized" hands .. meaning their
own .. in order to guarantee that the society will be
Western in nature and that Europeans can maintain
a high standard of living. These aims will tend, by
definition, to be at odds.
Societies in which the balance of power tips
toward local whites, as it did in Southern Rhodesia,
will then be minimally accomodative to African
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demands. Conversely, when Britain maintains suffi-
cient control in a colony or protectorate, as it did in
Nyasaland, white government is forced to be more
lenient and accomodative, compelled by relatively
liberal Britain.
If nationalist demands are met with substan-
tive accomodation, the movement will seek satisfac-
tion of further demands leading to the movement's
eventual goal. Such goals may change over time,
but ultimately goals must be satisfied at some
point. In other words, it is useless to hope that
nationalism will fade into obscurity when ignored,
as if it were a fad.
At the earliest point in African nationalism
--when the movement is first articulated --it is likely
that the movement will aim at making African op-
portunities equal to those of Europeans,
economicalIy and politically at a relatively gradual
pace.
If the nationalists' demands are not met with
substantive accomodation, the goals and ideology
of the movement will shift. If,for example, Africans
express a demand for integration in public places
that is not substantively met, or is even greeted
with harsh security measures, majority rule and
"one man - one vote" are likely to replace integra-
tion as a goal.
Similarly, ideology is likely, after a number of
frustrations, to become radical. Democratic
socialism or communism may replace liberal
democracy as the nationalist ideology. In
addition, the spirit of compromise in the nationalist
movement will further diminish. The more intense
and uncompromising nationalist lellliers will find
their support growing.
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In sum, frustration of demands reshapes the
political complexion of the oppressed majority.
Nationalist leaders will articulate this reshaping in
their changing goals and ideologies. The pattern of
demands, frustration, and shift will repeat, until the
nationalists' demands are met. If not met; the
movement will simply become more violent, until it
commits itself to armed revolution.
This simple model is complicated by the pattern
of dissension that will grow within the movement.
As a function of continually frustrated political ex-
pression and demands, the nationalist movement
faces the hazard of splintering, as different
elements in the majority shift ideology and goals at
different rates. Predictably, the rural peasant
farmers, conservative by nature, favor moderation
and are slow to shift, while the city residents, often
young, shift at a more rapid pace, gestating an in-
telligentsia that will lead the way to radicalism.
The leaders themselves are a variable bearing
influence on dissension. There is a tension in na-
tionalist leadership between simple expression of
the political temperature of the oppressed majority,
like a thermometer, and inflammation of political
feeling, like gasoline. Those who tend towards the
former may not provide initiative and fail to stay in,
the lead. Those who tend towards the latter may
jeopardize their power base. The most effective
leader leads the majority and yet remains in tune
with it.
Apparently, dissension results when a) an
urban/rural schism in the society prevents uniform
shifts, b) some leaders ride the tide of nationalism
by shifting and some don't, c) leaders allow personal
ambition and conflicting personalities to sharpen
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schisms, and d) tribalism or some other potentially
explosive division asserts itself.
Intra-nationalist squabbles evolve, in a sense,
along with inter-nationalist squabbles. Violence be-
tween African and African is often worse than
violence between African and white. Violence is in
fact bred as the spirit of liberal compromise fades,
rhetoric becomes thicker, ideology more
demanding, personal ambitions keener, communica-
tion more difficult and less desired, and violence
more of a historical precedent. After years of battle,
the ethics of means are ignored in the drive to ends.
Summing up, this hypothesis suggests that 11
the nationalist movement becomes more "radical"
when its present demands and ·goals are not met
with substantive accomodation and 2) the na-
tionalist movement will splinter in the face of con-
tinued frustration caused by the ruling white
minority and/or the ruling colonial power.
CASE STUDY
Southern Rhodesia is a pluralistic society, con-
sisting, in 1961, of 2,225,000 blacks, and 180,000
whites. A nationalist movement began here in 1955
and assumed broad proportions by 1957 with the
revitalization of the old African Nationalist Con-
gress. Whether or not the research hypothesis is
borne out depends on whether or not the nationalist
movement shifted policies, goals, and ideologies as
a result of white failure to generate meaningful ac-
comodation in the years following 1955.
Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral DecIaration of
Independence (UDI) in November, 1965 was a
dramatic move by the white minority both in the
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scope of the country's history and in the context of
the hypothesis, as its extremism solidified the
alienation of the nationalists that had been building
up. In declaring independence unilaterally, white
Rhodesia handed the nationalists a brash fait ac-
compli.unI is a striking example --a microcosm -of
the way racial tensions in Rhodesia were treated.
The period between 1955 and 1965 is therefore
convenient to study.
EARLY HISTORY
Although a number of external factors brought
about the rise of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia.
. the motivation for the nationalist movement
reaches back to earlier stages in the country's
history. At no point in Rhodesia's history did
Africans fully accept white rule. "The attitude of
protest had been there for years; there had been
movements of defiance; but each time people had
lapsed back into acquiescence to the settler regime
....' which misled white settlers into believing that
Africans would not seriously resist domination.
In 1890, a group of white settlers of British
origin living in South Africa went north into the
African interior under the "aegis" of Rhodes'
British South Africa Company (BSAC). The
Europeans occupied what is now Rhodesia in the
next decade. Considerable resistance was en-
countered from the two tribal groups in the area,
the Shona and the Matabele, culminating in serious
rebellions in 1893 and 1896. This resistance was
crushed by the Europeans, simply, with the
"superior origanization and technology'" that
Europe used to subdue the African and Asian
worlds.
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From 1890-1923, Rhodesia was administered by
the BSAC. "In opting against direct administra-
tion, Britain effectively conceded local autonomy to
the new settlers. "3 Because the ends of the BSAC
were purely financial while the settlers' stake in
Rhodesia was more personal -- Rhodesia was their
home --tension mounted between the BSAC and the
settlers with respect to policy aims.
When the BSAC decided to bail out of Rhodesia
around 1920, Britain was left with the problem of
governing Rhodesia. Solution of this problem was
deferred to the settlers in a referendum in 1922. The
settlers chose responsible government, as opposed
to amalgamation with South Africa. White
Rhodesia's fierce sense of independence today
stems in part from its early drive for autonomy.
As a colony, Rhodesia was subject to colonial
office rule. Britain sent a governor to Rhodesia to
act as a representative and to reserve for Britain
legislation pertaining to native affairs, technically a
British prerogative. In practice, though, the reserve
clause was rarely used. An understanding
developed between Britain and Rhodesia that
Britain would not invoke the reserve clause, but
would work out informal compromises when objec-
tions rose to Rhodesian legislation. Britain voiced
few such objections, and those arrangements
became a tradition. Local white rule was com-
prehensive from the inception of responsible
government through Federation to UDI, which cut
off even the theoretical possibility of British in-
tervention by peaceful means.
WHITES
Although whites in Rhodesia are not com-
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pletely homogeneous, most, in the period before
UDI, were of British origin, and professed a pride in
what they referred to as their civilized, British way
of life, and seemed to have a vague national
character.
Geographically, Rhodesia was vast, open
country for those coming from Britain. Whites who
lived there shared the traits that a frontier fosters:
individualism, self-reliance, restlessness with the
tedium and determinacy of highly socialized life,
and a corollary reverence of larger-than-life folk
heroes exaggeratedly rugged and strong.'
Another factor in white national character was
isolation. Rhodesian whites were not only isolated
from the rest of the world, prior to 1965, but were
largely isolated from native Africans because of
segregation and separate development.' Conse-
quently, Rhodesians both resented foreign in-
terference and were fundamentally ignorant of
African ways. Xenophobic, whites were contemp-
tuous of an African culture that they did not
understand, that seemed simply barbaric. Because
of their ignorance, whites feared any type of African
presence other than a servile one. With fear comes
reaction, both in security legislation and in the
violence of white reprisals to African demonstra-
tions.
Garfield Todd, the relatively liberal Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia ousted in 1957, once
suggested that whites were becoming a race of
"fear-ridden neurotics." Whites tended to see the
Africans simply as a threat to the civilized way of
life that was the European status quo.
Reformist elements did exist within white ranks
though. Garfield Todd, though paternalistic, be-
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lieved in reform and eventual majority rule.
Whitehead, his successor as Prime Minister, in-
stituted occasional reforms too, although with less
conviction. But in both cases, especially with
Whitehead, reform came too little and too late.
Whitehead, for example, promised Africans two or
three seats in the all-white Parliament (before'
Britain forced the offer to be increased to fifteen).
"The feebleness of this measure," commented one
writer at the time, "is pathetic in the light of recent
events. "6
The problem with the reforms of Todd and
Whitehead was that they were usually coupled with
the tightening of security legislation. This meant
that African demands were met not only "too little
and too late," but were countered by harsh security
measures that not only reacted to but anticipated
agitation.
Security was simply no small matter in
Rhodesia. The organization of society; extensive
army and police reserves, to puppetlike chiefs, to
land distribution pass laws, to ghettoized black
townships, and rigid legislation was a broad
security network unsparing in harshness. One item,
the Law and Order Maintenance Bill was
possibly the toughest security law in the
British Commonwealth of Nations. It
violates all known freedoms, gives the
police excessivepowers, and curtails the
discretion of the judges. Sir Robert
Tredgold, [former]Federal Chief Justice
resigned over this bill ... calling it "evil
and a threat to the rule of law."
The whites established, in the heart of
undeveloped Africa, what they often called the last
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in 1965." This discrepancy in expense makes the
fact that 85% of African children were enrolled in
school in 1960,14an achievement only on paper. The
double-standard educational policy accomplished
two things for the whites: 1) it reserved limited
funds for education of white children and 2) it kept
the quality of African education poor. As education
is correlated with demands on the political system,
radicalism of ideology, and effectiveness of
organization of an oppressed group, improving
educational opportunities for Africans would not
have served short-run white interests.
Concerning employment, the average annual
wage earned by Africans in 1963 was r 114.Non---
Africans, averaged f 1217. The minimum wage per
month was r 5 below the bare subsistence level de-
fined by statisticians. Unskilled jobs were set aside
for Africans. Skilled jobs were held by Europeans.
Both legislation and understandings between com-
panies and unions assured this. Where white unions
were concerned, Southern Rhodesia was a welfare
state; but because of the Industrial Conciliation
Act, this was not the case for African workers, who
were not allowed to join or organize unions. At this
point African workers were not even considered
employees. When they were finally allowed to form
unions, these were kept separate from white unions.
Because of this, and because of discriminatory
voting regulations in unions, African labor never
developed any political clout.
Finally, Africans were ultimately discriminated
against by franchise requirements. Although
couched in non-discriminatory language, the effect
of franchise requirements both in the pre-1961 and
in the 1961 constitutions was to silence the African
Rhodesian Nationalism 55
political voice. In the 1961 constitution for example,
a complex system of franchise requirements;
African citizens could qualify as 'lower-roll' voters
through any of six avenues in which various prop-
erty, age, and educational requirements were com-
bined to be just out of reach of most of the
country's over two million Africans. In an unofficial
plebiscite held by the NDP, over 99% of Africans re-
jected the 1961 constitution, primarily for this
reason.
Of course, the whole fabric of society
discriminated against Africans; land, education,
employment, and the franchise were but a few in-
stances. All rewards were routed to the whites, who
controlled political power, to the relative depriva-
tion of Africans. This is a situation with which the
Africans were never satisfied.
FEDERATION, PARTNERSHIP, AND
LIBERALISM
In 1954, Britain combined the colony of
Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring British
protectorates of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland to
form the Central African Federation. Federating
these territories accomplished a number of objec-
tives.
One such objective was the desire to tie
together the Federation countries economically, as,
federated, they comprised an integrated economic
unit. Southern Rhodesian whites, economically
driven, would provide the terrain and manpower for
secondary industry, with the wealth of copper being
mined in Northern Rhodesia serving as the com-
plementary primary industry for the Federation."
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A second design was also of major importance,
concerned racial harmony. Although Southern
Rhodesian whites were vastly outnumbered by
Africans, the percentages of whites in Northern
Rhodesia was even smaller, and in Nyasaland
miniscule. This, coupled with other factors, pro-
moted a strong African nationalism in the two pro-
tectorates. White settlers in the three territories
hoped that by tying Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland to a Southern Rhodesia with an en-
trenched, if small, white elite that nationalism in the
protectorates would be defused and thus the in-
stitution of majority governments there would be
prevented.
Conversely, Britain hoped to ameliorate the ex-
treme racial injustice in Southern Rhodesia in this
indirect manner. Although Joshua Nkomo, a
leading African nationalist since the early 1950's,
and other nationalist leaders campaigned against
Federation, for "most of the hitherto oppressed
Southern Rhodesian Africans, the prospect of
federation ... seemed full of promise. "16
The official racial policy of the Federation was
"partnership." Partnership was never formally
defined, so what politicians meant by it depended
on whether they targeted remarks for a British,
white, or African audience. The most specific obser-
vation that can be made about partnership is that it
was supposed to be the moderate alternative be-
tween the principles of separate developoment and
African domination."
In practice, partnership led to a modest effort
to remove minor examples of social discrimination,
without jeopardizing the advantages discrimination
gave to the artificially imposed economic affluence
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for whites." Therefore, such issues as land, educa-
tion, and the franchise -- crucial to maintenance of
white superiority-were usually exempt from mean-
ingful reform.
Coupled with minor reforms was a token alloca-
tion of two African MPs to represent the Africans in
each of the three federation states in Federal Parlia-
ment. Finally, if partnership could make possible
"some improvement in the economic position of the
African"" the appeal of nationalism to Africans
might be lessened.
These concessions had no impact on African
thought, except to convince Africans that partner-
ship offered them nothing. "The Africans in all
three territories feared and distrusted the portent of
continued white domination which the federation
represented."" Partnership meant for Africans
what Lord Malvern, first Prime Minister of
Southern Rhodesia, admitted with vivid candor it
meant: that Africans were the horse and Europeans
the rider.
Partnership at its finest, which was seen in
theory rather than practice, coincided with the in-
tent of the liberal movement which preceded, and
was cut short by, nationalism. The liberals gen-
erally believed that the Federation ought to become
a multi-racial society with gradual but substantive
accomodations made to African demands, with ma-
jority rule as the eventual end. Moral Rearmament,
David Stirling's Capricorn Society, and the Inter-
Racial Association were examples of liberal groups
run jointly by white liberals and pre-nationalist
Africans. These groups believed in genuine partner-
ship, rather than the superficial one Federation of-
ficials spoke of with such magnaminity. "Had there
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been any implementation, during the first years, of
those persuasive policies on which the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland was predicated, the early
failures of Congress and Convention might have led.
to the permanent demise of African nationalism. ""
There was a time when the liberal movement, had
its principles been adopted by the Federation,
might have led to a peaceful transition to majority
rule in Rhodesia. But, "by 1955 a stage had been
reached when Africans had begun to regard the
government as their own.""
Why did the liberal movement fail? "The most
powerful reason is that it provoked no response of
encouragement from the broad range of govern-
ment officials or white politicians."" A major blow
to the movement was the defeat in Parliament in
1954 of a bill outlawing public discrimination." It
was true that liberal pressure groups had no
parliamentary representation, and appealed to
those who were already liberal." The liberal move-
ment was not dynamic.
Liberalism had waned by 1957. A final blow was
delivered 'to it when Southern Rhodesian Prime
Minister Garfield Todd was ousted in the following
year. Todd, paternalistic, wanted to take the
Africans "by the scruff of the neck. and [say] 'come
with us into the twentieth century." Many
Africans "believed his government was in some
sense theirs.'?" When Todd was finally beaten in a
ballot for the Prime Ministership, essentially
because he had not reflected increasingly hard-line
white opinion in his government, "the few African
delegates in the hall could only see dust settling on
their hopes. ""
At that point, Nathan Shamuyarira, later to be
a leading nationalist concluded.
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The European body politic laid before our
eyes, bare and unmasked like a cold
corpse--unfriendly, uncooperative, and
unresponsive; in retrospect we would see
that the friendliness was only to lull us;
the cooperation was conditional on the
maintenance of white political domina-
tion and economic privilege; and response
was only to marginal pin-pricks that did
not cut the roots of white control inevery
sphere of the State."
The stage was set for the rise of nationalism.
NATIONALISM
"There were African tribal organizations before
European settlement and resistance movements of
many sorts from 1890 to 1950"" in Southern
Rhodesia. But these movements lacked the factors
of continuity and organization, and therefore hadn't
much in common with nationalism. It is also true
that they were not widely supported because the
rural population had not been politicized, mainly
because the government curtailed political activity.
A combination of external and internal factors
sparked the spread of the nationalist movement.
Africans who had served in the military had been
exposed to the modern world during World War II,
bearing personal witness to the lives and battles of
people overseas. Expectations also rose too when
African intellectuals visited countries in Africa that
had established majority governments (Rhodesia
was in fact at the heart of a continent that, piece by
piece, was throwing off the yoke of European rule;
in the nineteen-fifties there was constitutional prog-
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ress in Kenya and Nyasaland, Congo and Nigeria
were on the verge of independence, and DeGaulle
agreed in principle to self-government for French
West Africa and Equatorial Africa.)" And vital na-
tionalistic movements were growing rapidly in both
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
Also, Rhodesia itself was modernizing, as was
the rest of the world, and modernization leads to
better education and rising expectations.
Finally, the liberal movement had met with no
success. This failure provoked a shift in the goals
and ideology of African liberals. The shift was from
the gradualism of liberalism to a nationalism which
advocated more immediate change.
Although the nationalist movement has no
birthday, for the sake of convenience it can be said
that the movement began in Harare in 1955·with
the formation of the City Youth League." The
League consisted of a group of young urban blacks
of intellectual orientation; it is natural that na-
tionalism began in the progressive urban setting,
rather than back on the farms.
Nationalists told Africans to forget the old
liberal multi-racial ideal. "Do not hang on the backs
of European organizations like babies. Rely now on
yourselves," suggested James Chikerema, a na-
tionalist leader.
The League's first objective was to challenge a
rival African leader, Charles Mzingeli. Mzingeli had
"handled the authorities roughly,"" but was
basically liberal in orientation, and wanted to work
with the Government." Since African support was
limited, the League felt it should not be wasted on
Mzingeli. Dissension made for a rivalry which led to
the earliest violence and intimidation. At this stage,
though, violence was relatively mild.
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It was the short-sightedness of Mzingeli's ob-
jectives of which the League disapproved. Mzingeli
and the liberals wanted to pressure the government
into granting such relief as better township lighting
and better roads. But by 1956 and 1957, the na-
tionalists were thinking more about the franchise
and "the fundamental laws which created the of-
ficial and the parliament. ",.
An example of a project the League considered
worthy was the organization, in August, 1956, of a
bus boycott to protest an increase in bus fares
which poor urban workers could not easily afford.
The boycott continued for three days. "Burning of
food stalls, wrecking of bus shelters, stoning,
widespread looting, and even raping followed.»as
These incidents of violence constituted reprisals
against those Africans who had refused participa-
tion in the boycott. From this point on, violence and
intimidation were charges whites made incessantly
against the African nationalists.
In August 1957, the CYL reformed the old
African National Congress (ANC), which had been
banned in 1953 after the excesses of the Mau-Mau
problem in Kenya. The move was tactical, as op-
posed to ideological (as Todd, fairly lenient had not
forced a shift in ideology) to combine the "ideas and
vitality":" of the CYL with the experience and posi-
tion of the old Congress. The CYL sought a na-
tionalist party incorporating rural Africans with
the young urban intelligentsia. Joshua Nkomo, a
well-known former president of Congress was
chosen to head the new ANC, primarily to give the
party a "national figure at the head. ""
Nkomo was a moderate. As ANC president, he
called simply for "a society of equals." Similarly, an
62 Andrew Rodwin
excerpt from the party's statement of "Principles,
Policy, and Programme" sounds liberal in tone, em-
phasizing integration and partnership:
Its aim is the national unity of all the in-
habitants of the country in true partner-
ship, regardless of race, color,or creed.It
stands for a completely integrated
society: equality of opportunity in every
sphere; and the social, economic, and
political advancement of all. It regards
these objectives as the essential founda-
tion of that partnership betweenpeopleof
all races, without which there can be no
peaceful progress in this country.
But while such societies as Capricorn had been
conservative in their attitude towards African en-
franchisement, ANC was uncategorically not. ANC
demanded, boldly, "full participation of African
people in government. ""
The effectiveness of ANC was admitted by
Whitehead. He spoke of "the growing tendency of
the movement to incite people in rural as wellas ur-
ban areas to defy the law." Civil disobedience and
violence distinguished ANC from the more passive
liberal movement. Yet, "even this Congress was
hardly militant; most of its battles were fought in
the courtrooms rather than in the streets. In short,
the party was a moderate movement with some
rabid spokesmen. ""
Penetration into rural areas constitutes the
main achievement of ANC. Even in the late 1950's,
the rural peasantry comprised the backbone of the
African population. By concerning itself with the
problems of rural Africans, the ANC garnered rural
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support, a strategy with which the liberals had not
concerned themselves.
Edgar Whitehead was led to ban the party
when rioting in nearby Nyasaland culminated in the
Nyasaland Emergency in early 1959. Five hundred
party officials were arrested, and the legislature
passed a series of oppressive measures (Unlawful
Organizations Act and the Law and Order
Maintenance Act) to curtail nationalist agitation.
The harsh white reaction was, ironically,
directed against a political party that, though
responsible for limited violence, clearly had not
generated in Southern Rhodesia circumstances that
paralleled those of the Nyasaland Emergency, even
remotely. Justifying his actions in a speech which
brazenly admitted government indifference to civil
liberties, Whitehead declared,
It is a very ancient tradition of the
British people that governments should
defer action against subversive
movementsuntil rioting or bloodshedhas
occurred. My government does not
subscribe to this tradition. It had become
evident that if these people had been
allowed to continue indefinitely in their
courses, disorderand probablybloodshed
wouldbe the inevitable result.
In retrospect, it is clear that the banned ANC
furthered the relatively aggressive strategy pushed
by the CYL; ANC "signalled a change in attitudes
by openly attacking the white establishment and
what it stood for, and destroying the white concepts
and values which had been emulated by so many
missionary-educated Africans for so many years. ""
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In January of 1960, the National Democratic
Party (NDP) was formed. With the banning of ANC,
the momentum of the nationalist movement had
been temporarily frustrated. That the new NDP
would be more radical in its demands, and that it
would be more concerned with chopping off
discrimination at the roots rather than pruning
away specific manifestations, was predictable. And,
in fact,
TheNDP decidedto lay greater emphasis
than the ANChad ever doneon constitu-
tional and political development,and put
a lower priority on attacking the Land
Apportionment Act, the Land Husband-
ry Act and other discriminatory laws. It
shifted the emphasis from a plea for fair
treatment and humanity, to an outright
demand for self-rule."
Wrote Leonard Takawira, a nationalist leader, in
the most prominent journal in the Federation, the
Central African Examiner, "We are no longer ask-
ing Europeans to rule us well. We now want to rule
ourselves. "
Replacing Michael Mawema, Joshua Nkomo
soon became the leader of NDP. The new Nkomo
was more radical and forthright than before," while
still adhering to a promise to keep his supporters
"on the path of non-violence.":"
In so doing Nkomo was out of step with the rest
of the leading crest of the nationalist wave. General-
ly, "African moderates [were] having a hard battle
to summon enough support to meet changing white
opinion halfway. Many African politicians [had]
moved steadily left, and [despite the example of
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Kaunda and Nkomo] were gradually abandoning
moderation.' '44
Consequently, events were often shaped by
Nkorno's younger and more radical lieutenants."
Tactically then, the NDP was prone to violence.
With the NDP came "the beginning of physical
resistance to white settler rule.":" 1961 can be said
to have been a period of "subversive-infiltration"
by the nationalists'" If the NDP could create an en-
vironment of tension in Rhodesia, it was believed,
the appeal to Britain to interfere in Rhodesian
government would sound all the more urgent."
There was extensive rioting in Rhodesia in
1960. Thirty thousand Africans demonstrated in
Salisbury when NDP leaders were arbitrarily ar-
rested. The demonstration dissipated into sporadic
rioting after Government officials refused to meet
with the demonstrators. Violence spreade to most
urban centers in Rhodesia and continued until 1961,
bringing
strikes accompanied by violence in Que
Que and Gatooma; a most destructive
riot following the rejection of European
security men from an African meeting;
and, worst of all, a riot in Salisbury in
October which almost amounted to a
pitched battle between rioters and which
arose merely out of an accident involving
a European motorist and an African
cyclist."
NDP responded to these disturbances by ask-
ing Britain to "suspend the constitution and impose
a 'democratic order. "'50 Britain, exercising the cau-
tion and ambivalence characteristic of a colonial
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power dealing with colonies, sent the Monckton
Commission, a committee of dignitaries and ex-
perts, to the Federation to investigate. Although
the Commission described African hatred of Federa-
tion as almost "pathological," it urged that the
Federation should be maintained, provided that
sweeping reforms were instituted.
Whitehead had gone to London in April of 1960
to arrange a private agreement with Britain to
remove the reserve clause from the new 1961 con-
stitution then under consideration. In response to
an NDP appeal, Whitehead's request was deferred
until a constitutional conference to be held after the
Monckton Commission completed its report on
Federation. But NDP walked out of the conference
after the Commission reported that it supported
Federation, although its support was of a highly
qualified kind. The Commission, too, was highly
critical of those Federation practices to which the
nationalists objected.
The conference proposed a constitution with a
franchise divided into two rolls -- an upper (white)
and a lower (African). The African roll, with lower
franchise requirements, would elect fifteen
representatives out of a total of sixty-five. This did
not seem like much of a concession, as whites would
still have an overwhelming majority in Parliament.
Yet, conservative sources predicted that with an
African population increasingly able to meet the
educational (as opposed to income) requirements
that there would be a majority African electorate in
fifteen to thirty years." Still such a timetable was
too sluggish for the nationalists. Although Nkomo
originally accepted the compromise, he recanted
under pressure from the many radical lieutenants
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representing the radical Salisbury branches of the
party. Had Nkomo not recanted, it is very likely
that a serious schism would have rent the NDP in
two. As the matter was resolved, Nkomo's decision
to recant, and to urge African voters to boycott the
referendum was extremely popular, and healed the
rupture in the party. And while Rhodesian voters
--overwhelmingly white -- favored the new constitu-
tion by a 2 to 1 margin, an unofficial NDP plebiscite
showed that Africans were overwhelmingly against
it.
By rejecting the constitution, the nationalists
spurned the principle of gradual progress toward
complete political power at a later date; "the chance
was deliberately missed because the nationalists
[were] no longer interested in anything but taking
over. "52
The new "new Nkomo"quipped that he pre-
ferred not to swim with whites in pools but in
parliament, a metaphor reflecting a desire for
political strength rather than piecemeal reform.
With such an attitude, Nkomo was consistent with
party opinion. Further, Nkomo rejected the prin-
ciples of non- and multi-raciality in favor of African
rule, implying that in the event of a majority
government, whites would get no special represen-
tation as an ethnic group. The changes in Nkomo's
convictions can be seen as an attempt to flow with
the shifting tide of nationalism or as one leader's
personal ideological shift in the face of frustrated
demands, or as a combination of both.
Although no specific charges were levied
against it, NDP was banned in 1961. As with the
ANC, NDP was banned because of the anxiety
whites felt in an environment whose tension and
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violence were swelling. The whites reacted, an-
ticipating a level of violence that had still to
forthcome. Said Prime Minister Whitehead, in ex-
planation of the government's ban,
The position had been reached when my
professional advisors felt it necessary to
apply forwarrants to search the premises
of the NDP... It appeared clear that cer-
tain leaders had contemplated activities
likely to beprejudicial to the maintenance
of goodorder and inconsistent with party
politics.53
Ten days after NDP was banned, the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union was formed (ZAPU)
--Zimbabwe is the African name for Rhodesia .. but,
one writer concluded, "its goals, organization, and
activities were indistinguishable from the
NDP's. "54 If there is no shift reflected in ZAPU
policy it is because a ten day period is too short to
digest the frustration the nationalists suffered, and
to reformulate goals and ideology.
Another writer concluded that ZAPU's aims
were in fact wider than those of the NDP. But
ZAPU's constitution, although perhaps more
dogmatic and belligerent than that of the NDP,
touched on the traditional themes of one man· one
vote and pan-Africanism. The constitution's aims
included the following:
To establish the policy of one man . one
vote as the basis of government in this
country. To unite the African people so
that they liberate themselves from all
forms of imperialismand colonialism.
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A gradual change came over ZAPU, as a need to
turn to violent means was recognized. One na-
tionalist admitted that the decision to make exten-
sive use of arms and foreign-trained saboteurs in
Rhodesia is traceable back to 1962." In fact, "a
main feature of ZAPU's short life was a growing
conviction among Africans that their struggle
would have to involve bloodshed and violence""
because "It became the common view even among
normally moderate Africans that it was impossible
to reason with Europeans.'!"
The Government listed seventeen incidents of
violence during a six-month period in which it
believed ZAPU was concerned. During the twelve
months of 1962 there were 38 petrol bomb attacks,
10 attacks on schools, 9 attacks on churches, and 24
cases in which telephone wires were cut, or roads or
railways blocked. 58
After a large-scale outbreak of sabotage in
September, 1962, the Government banned ZAPU,
as it had the earlier parties.
In December of that year, Whitehead and the
relatively moderate United Federal Party (UFP)
were beaten by the reactionary Rhodesian Front in
a general election. If Whitehead was guilty of
reforming too little and too late, the Rhodesian
Front was guilty of an absolute failure to reform. In
fact, RF's espoused racial policy, called Community
Development, was nothing other than "a mask for
the policy of separate development," a former UFP
minister complained.
The nationalists boycotted this election in an
attempt to "crystallize the issue"" and force
Britain to perceive the gravity of the political situa-
tion in Rhodesia. The nationalists, ironically, hoped
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the RF would win, in order to force Britain's
diplomatic hand in the face of what would be con-
sidered, the nationalists believed, tantamount to a
catastrophe. But Britain did not interfere in any
substantive way with the accession of the RF to
political power. Britain's failure to do so, rather
than the fact of RF victory, amounted to yet
another frustration suffered by the nationalists.
At this point, the dormant cleavage in the na-
tionalist movement, between moderate rural
peasants represented by Nkomo and the radical ur-
ban intelligentsia, was aggravated and the party
ruptured. It was Nkomo's wish to establish a
government-in-exile in nearby Dar-es-Salaam, and
campaign for the liberation of Zimbabwe by appeal-
ing to the international community.
Objecting to self-imposed exile, Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole and other lieutenants of Nkomo
formed a new political party .. the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU).Not to be outdone,
Nkomo formed an underground party, calling it the
People's Caretaker Council (PCC). At this point,
"the struggle was simply for leadership, the forma-
tion of a new party being played down because it
confuse[d) the leadership issue. The split hard) not
assumed a clear radical-versus-conservative pattern
as might have been expected. "eo
Initially after their break, Nkomo and Sithole
vied for the support of the African masses, who
were less progressive than the urban radicals. This
is why any ideological basis of the split was muted.
Unfortunately for Sithole, the "average" Africans
supported Nkomo because they were "afraid a
change of leadership [would)lead to tougher policies
resulting in violence, [and they) feared reciprocal
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police action.':" By contrast, the more educated and
radical nationalists swung to Sithole and Nkomo, as
might be expected.
Although this "initial split can be put down to
personality and policy difference," later conflicts
between Nkomo and Sithole "assumed ideological ...
dimensions. "B2
Sithole eventually said of ZANU's political
orientation:
African politics in Zimbabwe,as well as
elsewhere in European-ruled Africa,
began as "reformist politics,"but nowwe
have entered the phase of "take-over
politics," as it is impossiblefor the pre-
sent white minority to rule Zimbabwefor
the benefit fo the voteless African
majority."
ZANU's objectives were confrontation and self--
liberation. Confrontation meant "armed physical
conflict, "" While liberation meant that the struggle
for freedom would take place inside Rhodesia by
Zimbabweans themselves. This policy conflicted
with Nkomo's, who, before 1965, favored the
cultivation of foreign support with accompanying
pressure on Britain, and, in turn, the RF govern·
ment. Nkomo's policy was consistent with his
earlier policy as leader of NDP.
A new element --the element of socialism .-was
included in ZANU's policy statement. Rhodesian
nationalist parties had not expressed a socialistic
philosophy before.
Ironically, despite the putative moderation of
the PCC, violent skirmishing erupted between it
and ZANU. 1964 saw "the worst political violence
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in years. "55 As the spirit of compromise had van-
ished and pent-up frustration exploded in brutality,
the nationalists could only resolve dissension with
violence, much more so than the CYL had with
Mzingeli and others back in 1955.
The RF government, in response to the ever--
threatening spectre of African rule combined with
the paranoid fear that Britain would act as an ac-
complice to the Africans in ousting whites from
political power, declared independence unilaterally
in November, 1965. This action dramatically
frustrated nationalist aspirations, as it meant that
Britain was no longer a big brother to which the
Africans could complain (even if Britain was in-
nocuous as a political ally).
CONCLUSION
Political events in Rhodesia, from the rise of
nationalism in 1955 to UDI in 1965, indicate that
the nationalist movement did develop an increas-
ingly radical ideology as a reaction to the in-
digenous white community's continuing failure to
meet demands with substantive accomodation. The
related hypothesis, that the movement will splinter
and engage in internal violence, is also borne out by
historical evidence, as by 1965. for example, ZANU
and the PCC were on either side of a serious schism
in the nationalist movement.
These political patterns perhaps extend to
pluralistic societies in general. In such societies,
elite minorities who continually curb and frustrate
the demands of an oppressed majority represented
by an organized, broad-based movement succeed
only in goading the majority into increasingly
belligerent action. Tightening security measures
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merely postpones inevitable consequences. The
longer and more completely the majority movement
is frustrated, the more radical and violent they will
become, and the more radical their political con-
stitutions will tend to be once majority rule is
achieved. Further, violence -- as opposed to
compromise -- will become the traditional way of
resolving disputes. From this perspective, the
political neurosis and instability of a contemporary
Africa emerging from a century of racial oppression
is not surprising.
Although a country like Iran does not fit the
specifications of a "white settler" society, it and
other developing countries with mass movements
may share these dynamics. The evidence that to
compromise "too little and too late" with such
movements only succeeds in goading them into ex-
tremism is convincing. But whether or not this is
true for Iran, it is clear that a country like Rhodesia
ought to be understood in the context of these
dynamics. Today, over 13 years, after UDI, it is ap-
parent that majority rule is inevitable, and in fact
Prime Minister Ian Smith seems sincere in his at-
tempt to bring about such rule, though in a
qualified form. Yet the African people have become
so politically divided that it is improbable that any
African leaders could form a government without
encountering serious violence from their dissenting
brethern. Leaders ranging from the Bishop
Muzorewa to the Marxist Mugabe are competing
for power, and some, like Mugabe and Nkomo, com-
mand dedicated guerilla armies. It is plain that
unless some consensus is achieved, whether
naturally -- as after the American Revolution, or
forcibly --as after the Russian Revolution, Rhodesia
will continue to suffer from vicious civil wars.
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Anthony Bowe
French Communism:
Modified Marxism?
Today, several European nations face serious
challenges to their established political systems.
While increasingly vociferous attacks emerge from
outside the political establishment in Spain and
Italy, by the actions of the Basque separtists and
The Red Brigade, major internal struggles are oc-
curing in several countries. The questioned fate of
Yugoslavia after Tito, the most recent collapse of
the labor government in Britain and important elec-
toral issues pervasive in French politics have made
Europe a hotbed of political interest. While study-
ing in Europe, Anthony Bowe encountered this
political climate and returned to the United States
with many strong impressions of these political ac-
tivities. It is within this context that the author ex-
amines the activities of the French Communist
Party and questions the sincerity of their platforms.
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The political heritage of many Western
European nations is being challenged by a seeming-
ly radical political alternative--a democratized form
of communism. This communism is rooted in tradit-
ional Marxist-Leninist thought, yet reflects at-
tempts at incorporating democratic principles to
achieve electoral viability. This moderation of what
is generally considered to be rigid dogma raises the
question of to what extent basic communist tenets
can be revised and still remain distinctly com-
munist. Currently, these questions must be ad-
dressed by many Western European nations but
especially so by France.
The French communist party's position typifies
this ideological dualism. Torn between Muscovian
orthodox interpretation and 'Eurocommunist' revi-
sionism, France, (oft-cited as Europe's political
laboratory), has once again become the center of
political change and innovation. Attempts to ex-
plain and understand the French Communist Party
(PCF) have led to many incongruous and contradic-
tory conclusions. One columnist writes: " ...the PCF
is a pillar of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and fideli-
ty to the Kremlin." Conversely, the French party
has been accused of being "not only not revolu-
tionary, but frankly conservative.'" It is more likely
that the true nature of French communism lies
somewhere between these two extreme positions.
Any analysis of current PCF activity is complicated
by the fact that many question the authenticity of
the PCF's drift towards a more moderate stance,
and launch accusations of opportunism and deceit.
Perhaps Georges Marchais, General Secretary of
the PCF advances the most appropriate comments:
"Our road to socialism is a French road. France to-
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day is neither Russia in 1917 nor Czechoslovakia in
1948."3
A brief history of the PCF is essential to an
understanding of its present alignment and
substance. The roots of Marxism run as deeply in
France as in any European state. However, a more
contemporary analysis should begin in 1920 with
the creation of the French Section of the Com'
munist International. Here a strong relationship
with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) was established. The party patterned itself
directly after the Bolshevik model, both structural-
ly (with party purges and a politburo), and
ideologically. Consequently, the party was purely
revolutionary and directly allied with Lenin and
Stalin.
After a brief period of apparent independence in
the mid-1930s, the French Section elected to en-
dorse the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This move was domestic
political suicide. It was not until the Germans in-
vaded the Soviet Union that the French Party,
renamed the PCF in 1943, joined resistance forces.
Their belated but formidable role in the resistance
earned the communists a spot in the cabinet of de
Gaulle's provisional government. Cold War
pressure soon brought an end to the PCF's active
participation in the government. The Party then
reassumed its pre-war character of proletarian inter-
nationalism, and Soviet tutelage. During this period
the PCF earned its reputation as the Soviet Union's
most loyal supporter in Western Europe. The Party
remained devoted to Stalin and committed to
ideological orthodoxy. But, Kurshchev's Secret
Speech at the 1956 Party Congress brought change
to the communist movement in France as well as to
the rest of Europe.
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Krushchev's speech is one of the hallmarks of
communist development throughout the world. The
result of the Party Congress was the birth of the
doctrines of peaceful revolution and peaceful coex-
istance. Marxist-Leninist doctrine stresses the need
for violent revolt against the exploiting class, but
on rare occasions Lenin referred to the possibility of
peaceful transformation. Itwas this concept which
Krushchev espoused in 1956. The impact of this
doctrine on communist parties striving for power in
western liberal democracies should not be
overestimated. It made communist attempts at
gaining power within a bourgeois, capitalist society
plausible and legitimate. Communist parties ceased
to be revolutionary organizations and became true
electoral entities. The political viability ofMarxism-
:"eninism increased with the rejection of violent
overthrow as the only road to socialism. In short,
Krushchev's move gave birth to the liberalization,
of communism. What the Soviet leadership may not
have considered was the fragmentation of the world
movement that would occur as a result of the
development of democratized western communism.
The French, however, were slow to take advan-
tage of Krushchev's initiative. While the Italian
Communist Party immediately declared the concept
of polycentrism, the French "decided to adopt the
most cautious approach of all the western parties."
Although the French eventually accepted the doc-
trine of peaceful revolution, they consistently re-
jected the Italian position of polycentrism. Maurice
Thorex, a prominant PCF member for over thirty
years until his death in 1963, was instrumental in
the Party's denial of polycentrism and worked for
the international growth of the Party. In fact, the
PCF was to be a vanguard of Soviet interests into
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the 1960's: According to Ronald Tiersky, "The
French acted vigorously to limit the fragmentation
of the international movement built around the
CPSU."5
However, the 1960s saw gradual but significant
change for the PCF. The Krushchev initiative of
1956 and the realization of the futility of waiting for
an appropriate revolutionary climate in a liberal
capitalist society were the stimuli for the indepen-
dent development of European communist parties.
An equally important cause of change in the PCF
was their interaction with socialist elements in
France. The French communists were consistently
moving toward the center with hopes of achieving
unity with the socialists. Although the PCF had
wider electoral support than the socialists, it was
the PCF that continually amended its position to
achieve compatibility. Several attempts at alliance
had ended in failure, notably in 1934 and 1947.
These failures were primarily due to communist in-
tractibility on plainly unacceptable points of revolu-
tionary doctrine. The 20th Party Congress signalled
an end to the orthodoxy which made communist
compromise impossible.
With the doctrine of a peaceful transition to
socialism, the PCF was free to manuever in a
typically political manner. Political alliance with the
socialists could be excused as a necessary tactic in
assuring the passage to socialism, although the im-
mediate consequence may be perceived as a distor-
tion of Marxist-Leninist principle. The implication
that interaction with the socialists is mere political
expediency prompts questioning of the
communist's sincerity. As Secretary General
Waldeck Rochet stated in 1966, "The position and
desire of the French Communist Party are clear: all
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activity is oriented to the goal of creating condi-
tions favorable to a peaceful passage to socialism. '"
The PCF also cites their overriding concern for
the French proletariat as a motivation for the
alliance. By working with the socialists, and subse-
quently gaining political power, it is possible to im-
prove the status of the proletariat while working
toward actualization of the communist state. In
fact, some French communists assert that the PCF
is not driven by the desire. for political control, but
rather by its devotion to the worker. Finally, the
success of Enrico Berlinguer in Italy may have en-
couraged the French to moderate their program and
ally with the socialists.
Whatever the reasons, the PCF and socialists
continually strengthened their relationship
throughout the 1960s. In 1959, the PCF expressed
its willingness to ally with other "democratic" par-
ties to achieve socialism, but other parties con-
sidered the communist attachment to such a con-
cept as the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be an
electoral liability. Furthermore, other parties had
no notion of what communist behavior might be
once they attained power. Previously articulated
communist doctrine described only a single party
transition to socialism. It is apparent that the
socialists had little desire to ally with the PCF when
the communists espoused platform contained in-
herent betrayal. Accordingly, in 1964 the PCF
stated that they had rejected "the idea that the ex-
istence of a single party is an obligatory condition
of the passage to socialism. "7 This statement
represented a major step in the democratization of
the PCF and also in its integration into French
politics.
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In 1965 the PCF and the socialists, (then known
as DGBS,) concluded an electoral alliance. The rela-
tionship has been called an alliance from the top, in
that it was negotiated by the parties' leaders and
represented no accord between the lower echelons of
party organization. No common platform was
issued with the declaration of electoral unity. In
that same year Francois Mitterand opposed Charles
de Gaulle in the presidential election. With PCF and
DGBS support, Mitterand was able to stand alone
against de Gaulle in the second round of balloting.
Although the united left lost the election, it had
strong support. The election was particularly mean-
ingful for the communists. As Tiersky commented,
"After 1965, the 'Communist problem' was once
again of immediate consequence in the highest
stakes in French politics." The PCF support for
Mitterand was highly significant for yet another
reason: the CPSU has supported de Gaulle and cen-
sured the PCF for plain disobedience. (Radical
change seemed to have overcome the Party.)
Following the 1965 election, the PCF began to
demand that a common program be written to back
up the electoral alliance. The DGBS was reluctant
to comply for fear it would only outline differences
and create friction. Their hesitation lasted through
the 1967 general elections. Prior to these elections
the PCF and the DGBS agreed to a policy of second
ballot withdrawal in which the party receiving more
votes in a district would be awarded the support of
the other party in the second ballot. Under this
scheme the alliance proved successful. Once
assembled, PCF and DGBS factions voted as a
legislative coalition.
On February 24, 1968, The Common Declara-
tion of the DGBS and the PCF was issued. The dif-
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ferences and similarities between the two parties
were delineated. Both parties agreed to work
toward an 'authentic and modem' democracy
through constitutional change. In the realm of
economics, both parties favored a lower retirement
age and a more efficient employment policy, but
disagreed on the issue of nationalization. The com-
munists proposed a rapid nationalization of all in-
dustry, a far more radical proposal than espoused
by the socialists. Similarly, in the area of foreign
policy the two parties were divided, the communists
staunchly opposing the European Economic Com-
munity, the socialists favoring it. The document in-
tentionally avoided questions of Marxist-Leninist
socialism and revolution; for these issues, basic to
communist ideology, were unresolved, and remain
so today.
In 1968, the strength of the alliance waned due
to rioting, general strikes, and the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. The 1969 presidential elections
also undermined PCF-DGBS solidarity, as the par-
ties ran separate candidates on the first ballot. The
PCF demonstrated its strength by capturing 21%
of the vote. The 1969 elections brought collapse to
the DGBS and the subsequent formation of the
Socialist Party of France under the leadership of
Francois Mitterrand. The Socialists wanted to
secure an alliance with the PCF. The result was a
common legislative program, negotiated in anticipa-
tion of the 1973 elections. The program was, accord-
ing to Kenneth Libbey, "the most far reaching step
the parties had taken since the split of 1920.'" The
PCF managed to pressure the Socialists into incor-
porating extensive nationalization. It was hoped
that a definitive platform would insure electoral
triumph. While the common program has remained
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intact to this day, the alliance has not been vic-
torious.
The extensive cooperation and agreement be-
tween the French Communists and Socialists makes
it difficult to differentiate between the two parties.
In fact, Emilie Talbot comments, "What we are
presented with is a program of reform that is hardly
distinguishable from that of many non-communist
socialist parties. "" However, there is a basic dif-
ference. Henry Canacas, Communist mayor of a
Paris suburb, claims, "our socialist comrades want
to go slowly. We don't believe in any concessions to
the exploiting class."!' The difference is one of at-
titude, not clearly reflected in policy statements
and platforms. The socialist prefers a democratic
transition. The communist has consistently had to
modify his position to maintain political solvency.
How much can truly be left behind during continual
ideological revision?
Revision of Marxist-Leninist ideology is per-
vasive among West European Communist Parties.
As parties like the PCF shift more towards the
center it is necessary for them to adjust their
reverance toward communist doctrine in light of
that change. Accordingly, much distortion and
manipulation of basic communist theory has oc-
cured at the hands of European communists. The
result is a more politically viable and electoraUy
manageable platform. Certain issues have come to
the forefront in the PCF in the last twenty years of
development. Most essential to the communist
adaptation was the decision to operate for change
within a capitalist democracy. Previous interpreta-
tion of Marxist doctrine caused the communists to
operate as revolutionaries on the periphery of
organized politics. But as noted earlier, Lenin's etta-
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tion of rare instances of peaceful revolution as
described by Krushchev at the 1956 Party Congress
made possible the legitimate development of the
PCF.
Shouldthe countryrefuse to givethe par-
ties of themajority (PCFand Socialists)a
vote of confidence,they wouldwithdraw
from the government and take up the
cause in opposition."
Until 1971, the communists had stated that they
would not give up power if voted out of office, but
instead would remain and defend socialism. Mayor
The move into organized politics presented
many other problems created by the conflict be-
tween ideological purity and political reality.
Libbey suggests, "The PCF is an example of a party
with a strongly orthodox ideological background
which has had to accomodate itself to a hostile
political environment."" Because orthodox doc-
trine proclaims the necessity of a single party to
lead the way toward socialism, the PCF found itself
in a difficult position. Consequently, the PCF first
rejected the requirement of a single party transition
to socialism, and later recognized multi-party
politics once socialism was achieved. The PCF has
cited the existence of more than one party in some
East European communist countries as a precedent
for their recognition of post-transition multi-party
politics. They have expressed the need for rural
representation in addition to their representation of
the urban working class.
The final step in the PCF's integration into the
'legitimate' political arena was expressed in the
following statement made in 1971:
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Canacas now asserts that, of course, the com-
munists would relinquish power if voted out, but
does not envisage that eventuality. Canacas
believes that the voters will become enamoured
with the PCF once communist reforms are
initia ted. 14
Another symbolic change in ideological content
was the rejection of the "Dictatorship of the
Proletariat" as part of the platform. Although
Lenin and Stalin had revised its meaning, the PCF
decided to drop the term altogether. In 1964, the
moderate wing of the Party suggested abandoning
the term as no longer useful. But at that time Assis-
tant Secretary Georges Marchais rejected the pro-
posal vehemently. Eight years later in August,
1972, Marchais said, "We no longer employ that ex-
pression (Dictatorship of the Proletariat) because as
a result of fascism, the word dictatorship evokes a
regime which excludes democracy and liberty.""
Marchais did not, however, claim that the concept
had been abandoned. In 1976, Marchais reiterated
the Party's rejection of the term, and also rejected
the concept. The Party had determined that the
peaceful transition to socialism did not include a
proletarian dictatorship. Some Party members
became distraught at what they considered to be a
bastardization of Marxist-Leninist theory. A
splinter group, made, up primarily of students, ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the PCF and pro-
claimed Mao to be the paragon of modern com-
munism. The New Yorker commented, "Who would
have thought that the powerful French Communist
Party would not be treated by French intellectual
youth as passe. "16
The changed appearance of the PCF is not ac-
cepted as genuine by all observers. The most ada-
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mant of disbelievers assert that the entire com-
munist movement in Europe is controlled by the
CPSU. They suggest that every opportunistic
change in platform or even denunciation of Soviet
activity is authorized in Moscow before implemen-
tation. Such far reaching allegations are probably
more the result of Cold War hangovers than ra-
tional investigation. Yet many believe that the com-
munists have altered their appearance only to gain
power and will revert to orthodoxy and Soviet com-
panionship once they achieve that goal. Analysis of
two exemplary incidents, the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia and French reaction, and the May
riots in 1968, tend to support such a belief.
On August 20, 1968, the Soviet Union sup-
ported by other Warsaw Pact signees invaded
Czechoslovakia. The invasion marked the ultimate
frustration of Alexander Dubcek's 'communism
with a human face.' The reactions of European com-
munists parties were watched very closely as
barometers of the extent to which change had really
taken place in the various parties. Such an obvious
violation of sovereignty in reaction to a liberaliza-
tion of communist doctrine would have a direct
bearing on the reforming western parties. Condem-
nations of the Soviet action were issued by all the
European party chiefs. But, while the other com-
munist parties remained in opposition to the
Soviets. the French party began to temper their in-
itial criticisms. Three days after the invasion, the
PCF issued a statement recognizing coercion as a
tool of negotiation. On August 26. the Party ex-
pressed their satisfaction with the 'normalization'
of relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
Union. which involved the removal of Dubcek and
the installation of a puppet regime. Critics of the
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PCF assert that the Party's objection to the Soviet
action was minimal and that their conduct reflects a
continual subservience to Soviet internationalism.
However, PCF conduct during the 1968 May
riots indicates a high degree of restraint and respect
for legal order. One observer called the PCF a
"model of moderation. "17 The spring of 1968 suf-
fered several months of social turmoil, culminating
in May with student riots in Paris and a general
strike. Rather than attempt to capitalize on the
chaotic circumstances, the communists assisted the
government in efforts to keep certain vital services
.functioning. While Mitterrand called for de Gaulle's
resignation, the PCF quietly cooperated with the
government during a potentially revolutionary
period. This is considered by some as proof of the
PCF's desire to work within democracy.
Although the external appearance of the PCF
may be one of liberal reform, the internal structure
is strictly disciplined and ordered. At party con-
gresses, dissension is not tolerated. The expulsion
of Roger Garaudy from the PCF in 1970 for publicly
criticizing accepted PCF policy is indicative of in-
ternal rigidity. The decision making process is far
from democratic. Important decisions are made by
the leadership without consulting lower party
echelons. If current internal party procedure is a
foreshadowing of future conduct when in political
power, the future of democracy in France may be
threatened.
The personal character of PCF party leader
Georges Marchais is the center of substantial
debate. The Economist refers to Marchais as a
Stalinist, whose courteous public political dealings
mask his true nature: "Marchais is conducting
himself with the utmost delicacy," states one
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reporter." Marchais authored a book about the
French communist movement entitled Le Defi
Democratique. A reviewer of that book stated the
following:
Marchais is quite adept at...eliminating
all related informationthat might tend to
weaken his thesis. (His) second major
weaknessis his uncritical admiration for
the achievementsof the SovietUnion."
Furthermore, Marchais' cavalier attitude to the
plight of Soviet dissidents leads one to question the
status of the political outcast in a communist
France. Regardless of some unattractive evidence,
Marchais preaches democracy and political
freedom.
The 1978 general elections proved to be a disap-
pointment for the PCF and the French left. In the
months prior to the elections, the PCF-Socialist
alliance began to deteriorate. The French left
entered the first round of the March, 1978 elections
deeply divided, yet managed to come within one
percent of the governing coalition if the PCF and
Socialist tallies were combined. With the possibility
of gaining control of the government in mind, the
Socialists and the communists renegotiated their
joint policy of second ballot withdrawal, to be im-
plemented in the run-off elections. Their hopes for
success proved clearly illusory. French voters ap-
parently looked with disfavor on the opportunistic
mid-election reunion between the Socialists and the
PCF. Another factor in the left's defeat may have
been President Giscard d'Estana alarmed appeal to
French voters that they abandon the leftist coali-
tion. The elections yielded the governing coalition a
strong majority and sent the left into disarray.
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Although the PCF and the Socialists still claim
to be allied, such an assertion is more the result of
political convenience than true reflection. The
alliance has deteriorated since the surprising and
frustrating defeat of 1978. While party leaders still
pledge allegiance, lower echelons of the two parties
have found it increasingly difficult to cooperate.
Disagreement over taxation and an appropriation
among local office holders has resulted in dismissals
and resignations. This antagonism between the
Socialist and PCF lower levels has caused some to
assert that the relationship is unworkable.
Turbulence within the alliance since early 1978
has been accompanied by considerable dissent from
within the parties themselves. Some members of the
Socialist Party have suggested that further efforts
toward a viable alliance with the PCF are futile, and
that the Socialists should look to the right for
potential allies. As might be expected, the left wing
of the Party advocates a bolstering of the PCF
friendship. In the PCF, dissent has been more
noticable, partially because of Marchais' efforts to
silence any criticism. CalIs for both ideological puri-
ty and further compromise couched in criticism of
the Party leadership is heard from both wings of the
Party. Little has been decided concerning direction
within the two parties, but it is certain that the PCF
and the Socialists will prepare for the Presidential
elections of 1981.
The PCF is at a sensitive stage in its develop-
ment. For almost two decades the PCF has polled
approximately 20% of the vote. These figures in-
dicate that the French far-left is constant in its com-
position, and that PCF membership is in a state of
near stagnation. If this is true, then communist
hopes for governmental control must continue to
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hinge on an electoral coalition. In any event,
political forecasters do not predict a decline in sup-
port for the PCF, and readily acknowledge the
potential for expansion.
What is in store for France should the com-
munists come to power? There is no consensus on
the matter. James Burnham of the National Review
writes, "It is ridiculous to suppose that a monolithic
totalitarian party could inaugurate and preserve a
pluralist democratic society.'?" Burnham goes on to
express his fear that if in power, the communist par-
ties of West Europe would ally with Moscow. He
scoffs at the notion of reformed communism or
'Euro-communism": "You can stop being a com-
munist, but you can not alter what it means to be a
communist."" Burnham's assertions, unfortunate-
ly, are reminiscent of the irrational approach to
communism which.has plagued so much of western
commentary since World War Two. By suggesting
that one "can not alter what it means to be a com-
munist." Burnham implies that communism is in-
capable of the development and adjustment that
political philosophies constantly undergo. Just as
the concept 'liberal' has a much different connota-
tion today than it did one hundred years ago, com-
munism should be recognized as an evolving and
adapting ideology. Fears that the PCF wishes to
gain power and become another Soviet satelite also
seem unfounded. Unlike the Warsaw Pact nations
the French communists, should they come to power,
will have accomplished this feat through electoral
victory. It is difficult to imagine the communists
relinquishing their hard won control to Moscow.
Harder yet to accept is the possibility that the
French people will peacefully surrender their
sovereignty to a foreign power.
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Emilie Talbot of Commonweal asserts in
reference to the PCF, "It would seem that this Com-
munist Party's respect for legality is genuine.""
The Communist Party of France has indeed
undergone a change. The Party doctrine has been
matured and adapted to fit the modern, industrial,
egalitarian state that is France. Surely, there is
much to question in this change, but it is doubtful
that the PCF is pursuing a massive campaign of
deceit. Whatever their intentions, "the French Com-
munist Party at the present time seems quite
capable of at least initiating unquestionably radical
change in French society. "23
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Susan Denney
The Theme of Moral
Reckoning In Gunther
Grass' Cat And Mouse
And The Clown And Billiards
At Half Past Nine
By Heinrich Boll
The fall of National Socialism in 1945 marked the
beginning of the German predicament. This predica-
ment is the problem of dealing with guilt associated
with German support for or complacency towards
Nazism. This burden of guilt is still felt by Germans
who had no direct participation in the second world
war. The question is how can the German people
have a strong, proud sense of National identity
while still in the shadow of the Nazi horrors. In this
article, Susan Denney discusses Gunther Grass'
and Heinrich Boll's notion that one must learn how
to live in the present unfettered by guilt, but must
not disassociate oneself from the past.
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During the period of Nazi domination in
Germany, all aspects of the German culture which
did not promote the National Socialist ideology
were systematically suppressed. The result was the
creation of a German identity which was virtually
synonymous with Nazism-a self-image which most
post-war Germans have found heinous. As Golo
Mann notes in The History of Germany Since 1789,
the Nazi infused culture was one "Of which the
Germans had reason to be profoundly ashamed. "1
The only way to resolve the guilt which arose from a
Nazi definition of the German people was to review
the Nazi period and restructure the concept of the
German national identity.
The redevelopment of the German culture was
particularly problematic for German writers.
Because Hitler had allowed publication and
distribution only of material which was un-
mistakably pro-Nazi propaganda, German writers
had been prevented from developing a contem-
porary literature which was at once characteristical-
ly German yet distinct from Nazism. Consequently,
when they began to write again after the war,
German writers needed to first develop an accep-
table literary style for their work. Furthermore, as
individual Germans, the post-war writers also need-
ed to redefine the Nazi-tainted national identity
and, in doing so, to become reconciled to their im-
mediate past.
In an essay on Modem German Literature,
Malcolm Pasley assesses the effect of the search for
a positive national identity on post-war literature.
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A major feature of post-war German
literature ...has been the preoccupation
with the theme of moral responsibility
and guilt in relation to Germany's im-
mediate national past ...the weight of con-
scious or unconsciousguilt-feelingsmade
itself felt even where complicity in evil
deedswas not the overt issue of the work.
No writer could avoid a reckoning with
the past ...even if he chose...to shunt the
burden of guilt on to others,"
The theme of guilt, or more generally, moral reckon-
ing, is evident in at least three post-war German
works: Cat and Mouse by Gunter Grass, and
Billiards at Half-Past Nine and The Clown by
Heinrich Boll. Both Grass and Boll address the
disruptive effects of post-war guilt and offer their
characters as examples of how guilt can be resolved.
Furthermore, through reflection, both authors
engage in a moral reckoning of their own.
Heini Pilenz, the narrator of Gunter Grass'
novella, Cat and Mouse, is writing to clear his
"gloomy conscience" which has been "driving (him)
to do underpaid social work in a settlement house"
since the war instead of accomplishing more with
his life. Specifically, the guilt to which Pilenz aludes
stems from the betrayal of his friend, Joachim
Mahlke, and from his complicity in Mahlke's death
at the end of the war. As Pilenz's relationship to
Mahlke exists only for the duration of the war in
Danzig (where the action takes place), it could be
said more generally, that Pilenz's guilt stems from
his behavior during the war.
Joachim Mahlke's outstanding characteristic is
an enormous Adam's apple which Pilenz refers to as
Mahlke's "mouse." The Adam's apple, and,
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therefore, the mouse, are features which serve to
differentiate Joachim Mahike from everyone else.
Overall, Pilenz paints a picture of Mahike as unique
among his peers and this uniqueness leads Pilenz to
equate Mahike himself with the mouse.
Mahike is not a mouse until he learns to swim
(and in doing so, becomes outstanding) after the
onset of the war in Danzig. Pilenz tells us, "When
shortly after the outbreak of the war Joachim
Mahike turned fourteen, he could neither swim nor
ride a bicycle; there was nothing striking about his
appearance and he lacked the Adam's apple that
was later to lure the cat." Thus, it is only under the
circumstances of the war that Mahlke, the in-
dividualist, becomes a mouse-vulnerable at every
moment to attack by the more powerful, conform--
ist, cat.
In the initial episode of the novella, Pilenz en-
courages a cat to pounce on the sleeping (and
therefore innocent and defenseless) Mahlke's
mouse, an act which is representative of Pilenz' s
final betrayal of Mahlke. In both the initial and final
episodes, Pilenz is not necessarily the sole cause of
MahIke's victimization and death, but he is clearly
guilty of complicity in these acts. His sin, therefore,
is not the sin of being the aggressor cat, but of call-
ing MahIke's "mouse to the attention of this cat and
of all cats."
Pilenz writes the story of Cat and Mouse
because, in his words, "what began with cat and
mouse torments me today." His aim is to free
himself from the guilt which has prevented him
from leading a productive life, and the method he
chooses to relieve his guilt is confession. After
writing the story, Pilenz can finally admit that, with
or without sufficient reason, he set the cat(s) onto
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Mahlke--an action which he regrets but can not
allow to torment him any longer.
With Pilenz as an example then, Grass ad-
vocates coming to terms with post-war guilt
through confession. By his use of the cat/mouse
polarity, Grass defines good and evil; a process
which serves the same function for him that confes-
sion serves for Pilenz. Both authors and characters,
through their writing, attempt to specify that which
was evil about the Nazis. In his own moral reckon-
ing, Grass concludes that the evil inherent in
Nazism was the conformity which operated to sup-
press individualism, and not participation in war
crimes; an idea which is also expressed in the novels
of Heinrich Boll.
In Billiards at Half-Past Nine, Boll creates a
polarity of good and evil which is similar to Grass'
device of the cat and mouse. Every character in
Billiards is referred to either as a lamb, or as one
who has partaken of the host of the beast; a distinc-
tion which exists in contemporary society as well as
in Nazi society.
The action in Billiards unfolds in a series of in-
ner monologues voiced by three generations of the
Faehmel family on September 6, 1958. The bulk of
the novel deals with the early part of the day in
which the three main characters (Heinrich Faehmel;
his wife, Johanna; and their son, Robert) prepare for
a celebration of Heinrich's birthday. All of the
characters reflect continually on their lives and, in
doing so, divorce themselves from the reality of the
present day: Robert while playing his habitual
billiards, Heinrich by contemplating his previous
failures, and Johanna by retreating to the asylum.
It is only at the birthday celebration that all
characters return to the present day reality.
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By perpetually living in the past, the members
of the Faehmel family have become alienated from
each other. Heinrich particularly is unable to corn-
municate with his son and wife because of the guilt
he feels for having failed to. "feed his lambs"
despite, or perhaps because of, his success in life.
When he instructs his secretary to spit on "his
monument" for all the people whom he could not
help, Heinrich is condeming his successful life
because it did not enable him to save all the lambs
who perished during the war.
Of all the characters in the novel, Johanna is the
most important in that she serves the function of a
prophet. Johanna is aware that the fllllill!ymembers
are living in the past: "They try to forget
themselves in building things, its like opium," and
it is she who is also responsible for their return to
the present. The method Johanna advocates for
recovery from the guilt of the past is action. She im-
plores Heinrich to stop dwelling in the past: "don't
ask your grandchildren to spit on your statue, simp-
ly make sure you never get one," and the spell of the
past is irrevocably broken when she finally takes ac-
tion by shooting an ex-Nazi minister during the
birthday party. After this act, the family is reunited
and the novel draws to a close. Through Johanna
then, Boll asserts that it is necessary to act in the
present rather than to dwell in the past to get over
the burden of guilt arising from the war.
Throughout Billiards Boll continually draws
parallels between the contemporary society and
that of the National Socialists. Several of the [con-
temporary] dignitaries were prominent Nazis, and
Jochen, the hotel clerk, warns, "watch out;
sometimes I think: they did win after all." Further-
more, Boll uses the same motifs in describing the
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Nazi and contemporary societies. Johanna refers to
Nazi Germany as "a world where just raising your
hand once may cost you your life" and later she
warns Heinrich [against the contemporary society]
"Don't you see they'd kill you for less than a
gesture."
In drawing the parallels and in defining his
characters as lambs versus those who have par-
taken of the host of the beast, Boll redefines conven-
tional notions of good and evil. Not all Nazis were
evil, and not all members of the contemporary
society are good simply because they no longer
espouse the Nazi ideology. Because Boll does not
define evil as synonymous with Nazism, evil is not
something which he believes existed only in the
past, but is something which is still common in the
contemporary world. Similarly, good is not an at-
tribute restricted to those who actively fought the
National Socialists but is represented by principled
individuals who, like Heinrich, "are trying to follow
idealistic and Christian principles in everything
they think and do."3 The theme of good and evil ex-
pressed as a conflict between principled in-
dividualists and opportunistic conformists is more
strongly stated in Boll's later work, The Clown.
The action in The Clown, like that in Billiards,
takes place in one day. After a disastrous perform-
ance, Hans Schnier, a clown, returns to his apart-
ment where he reflects on his life; primarily on his
relationship to and recent separation from his
girlfriend, Marie.
The emphasis of Schnier's reflections is on the
closely knit society of Marie's Catholic friends
toward which he is particularly antagonistic. The
purpose of the group is not so much to develop an
appreciation for Catholicism as it is to elicit
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conformity from its members. Years before, when
Zupfner, one of the leaders of the group, had asked
Schnier to become a member, Schnier had replied
that he was not a Catholic. Zupfner responded by
laughing and said, "We sing--and I bet you like to
sing." And, Schnier emphasizes, Zupfner and the
Catholic circle act as a unit; not one member will
break from conformity to help him locate Marie,
even though they all know where she is.
But it is not only the Catholics that Schnier ac-
cuses of mindless complicity, society in general is
guilty of the same lack of adherence to principle. In
speaking of the writer Schnitzler, who has risen to
prominence in contemporary society on the basis of
his false claim to have resisted the Nazis, Schnier
says, "A hypocrite like that doesn't even have to
tell lies to be always on the right side of the fence."
Schnitzler doesn't have to tell lies because society
defines good and evil arbitrarily without determin-
ing the true worth of an individual. Schnier's
mother, who is highly respected in society gives
speeches in America in the same tone of voice with
which she sent Schnier's sister off to promote the
war effort. Similarly, Herbert Kalick, the once avid
Nazi supporter, is awarded the Federal Cross of
Merit, even though he has not changed in any
respect.
Schnier is an individualist who is persecuted for
his refusal to conform in a society which demands
conformity. It is because he refused to conform to
the expectation that he participate in a formal mar-
riage ceremony that Schnier lost Marie. His choice
of profession and lifestyle, because they are
unconventional, lead Schnier's family to abandon
him. When Schnier resists his father's attempts to
coerce him into taking lessons from a famous
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teacher, his father rescinds a previous offer of finan-
cial support.
Despite Schnier's often offensive behavior, he
must be admired for his uncompromising consisten-
cy. By depicting Schnier as a hero, Boll implies that
strict adherence to principle, regardless of the con-
sequences, is good, whereas mindless conformity is
evil in its consequent supression of individualism.
According to Wilhelm Schwarz, in Heinrich Boll;
Teller of Tales. .
This ideal is confronted in Boll's work
with the desperate or the chauvinistic
Germany of the twentieth century. Man
has to make a choice between uncondi-
tional adherenceto his chosenidealon the
one hand...and an unworthy opportunism
and conformance on the other...There is
no possibility of compromise.'
And so, at the end of The Clown, Schnier sets out to
beg in the railroad station-an action which will cer-
tainly ruin his career, but which is the only solution
to his predicament which is consistent with his prin-
ciple of individualism.
Heinrich Boll's contempt for the conformist is
reiterated in a semi-autobiographical piece
published in Saturday Review (May 3,1975). Referr-
ing to the post-war period, Boll states, "I resented
the opportunism of others who suddenly behaved as
if they were not Germans" because "it no longer
served any purpose, in Germany or elsewhere, to be
German.'" This emphasis on the unprincipled op-
portunism of the conformist is the basis of Boll's
proposition that good and evil are qualities which
exist equally in the contemporary and National
Socialist societies.
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Both Boll in The Clown and Billiards at Half-
Past Nine and Grass in Cat and Mouse offer ex-
amples of how to resolve guilt arising from the war.
Grass's narrator must confess his sins to escape the
guilt which has plagued his life. Similarly, the
Faehmels must concentrate on their present lives in
order to regain family unity. Finally, Schnier must
abide by his principles in order to avoid a life of
dissatisfaction and guilt.
Through their works, Grass and Boll also
engage in their own moral reckoning. By re-
evaluating conventional notions of the evil of
Nazism, both authors arrive at the conclusion that
evil is an attribute which is neither peculiar to nor
necessarily characteristic of the German people.
Both Grass and Boll are attempting to bolster the
Nazi-tainted German identity through careful
reflection on the immediate past.
The theme of moral reckoning in Grass and Boll
is specific to guilt arising from the stigmatic
German national identity. Clearly, the Germans are
not the only people who have had to combat a
negative national or ethnic identity, but few groups
of people in modern history have been so widely or
vehemently stereotyped as evil solely on the basis
of their nationality. While Grass and Boll refute the
stereotype that all Germans are inherently evil,
they imply that guilt and the compulsion for its
resolution are uniquely characteristic of the
German people.
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